Reed Day v. Ben Henry, 129 F.4th 1197

Arizona law allows only retailers with an in-state physical presence and an Arizona manager to ship wine directly to consumers in the state.
Plaintiffs, Arizona residents, sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming the law violates the Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state retailers.
Arizona uses a "three-tier" alcohol distribution system separating producers, wholesalers, and retailers, justified as promoting public health and safety.
Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief; the district court granted summary judgment for the state and an intervenor (Wine and Spirits Wholesalers Association of Arizona).
The district court held the law was not discriminatory because it applied to all retailers, regardless of residency, and that plaintiffs likely lacked standing.
On appeal, the Ninth Circuit found plaintiffs had standing but affirmed the law’s constitutionality, with one judge dissenting in part.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing	Suffered injury from inability to receive wine; actionable under § 1983.	Courts cannot grant meaningful relief; unclear which laws are at issue.	Plaintiffs have standing; relief is possible.
Is Arizona’s physical presence law facially discriminatory under the Commerce Clause?	Law favors in-state retailers; out-of-state retailers must set up costly in-state operations.	Law applies equally to all, regardless of residency or origin; not facially discriminatory.	Law is not discriminatory; applies evenly to all retailers.
Do precedents (Granholm, Tennessee Wine) prohibit Arizona’s regulatory scheme?	Supreme Court barred similar in-state presence requirements as discrimination.	Precedents only prohibit discriminatory exceptions, not neutral three-tier systems.	Precedents do not prohibit Arizona’s neutral three-tier scheme.
Should case be remanded for factual inquiry into public health justification?	Yes, because scheme is discriminatory and must be justified by concrete evidence.	No, because system is not discriminatory and is presumptively valid.	No remand; law constitutional on its face. (Dissent: would remand for evidentiary hearing.)

Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460 (2005) (state laws discriminating against out-of-state wine producers violate the Commerce Clause unless justified by legitimate local purposes)
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 588 U.S. 504 (2019) (elaborated the two-step test for evaluating state liquor laws under the Commerce Clause and the 21st Amendment)
Dean Milk Co. v. City of Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (locality-based requirements that inhibit interstate commerce are facially discriminatory)
Camps Newfound/Owatonna Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (state actions discouraging out-of-state entities from competing are protectionist and violate the Commerce Clause)
Fulton Corp. v. Faulkner, 516 U.S. 323 (1996) (examined state tax schemes for discriminatory effect against interstate commerce)