Redmond v. State, 213 Md. App. 163

On March 1–2, 2010, a high‑school student was robbed of a cell phone; ATT detectives used cellular signal data to narrow the phone to the 3300 block of Round Road.
ATT detectives used a ruse (claiming to look for a pedophile named “Leroy Smalls,” with a photograph) to gain entry to 3305 and then 3303 Round Road; occupants were misled about the officers’ purpose.
Once inside 3303, an ATT detective dialed the stolen phone’s number; a ringing phone upstairs led officers to observe the phone on a dresser. Occupants were then detained; a search warrant was obtained later that evening and the phone and knives were seized.
Appellant (resident and Jones’s boyfriend) was charged with robbery and related offenses; he moved to suppress evidence obtained from 3303 as fruits of an unlawful warrantless entry.
Trial court denied suppression, finding consent or, alternatively, exigent circumstances; appellant was convicted and sentenced. The appellate court reviews voluntariness/scope of consent and whether the independent‑source doctrine saved the warrant.

Issue	Appellant's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether entry into 3303 was consensual	Consent was coerced/induced by an extreme ruse; any claimed consent was not voluntary	Testimony that occupant told officers to “come on in” and did not ask them to leave shows voluntary consent; ruse does not automatically vitiate consent	Entry was not voluntary: ruse directly induced consent and eroded its quality; consent vitiated
Whether police exceeded scope of consent by dialing the stolen phone and doing a protective sweep	Even if consent to enter existed, it was limited to showing the photo and identity check; dialing the phone and upstairs search exceeded scope	Officers lawfully present and actions akin to plain‑view discovery; protective sweep for officer safety	Police exceeded scope: dialing the phone was an affirmative investigatory act beyond the stated purpose
Whether evidence was admissible under independent‑source doctrine	Warrant was based on information obtained during illegal entry; doctrine does not apply	Warrant obtained later with probable cause independent of the illegal entry	Independent‑source doctrine does not apply: warrant relied on tainted information; excising tainted averments leaves insufficient probable cause
Disposition: remedy for unlawful entry and taint	Suppress fruits; convictions must be reversed	Evidence should be admitted; convictions stand	Suppressible error: convictions reversed and case remanded

Brown v. State, 378 Md. 355 (Md. 2003) (police ruse did not vitiate consent where officer identified himself as police and did not misrepresent purpose after initial deception)
Perkins v. State, 83 Md. App. 341 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1990) (consent induced by false purpose eroded scope of permission and did not justify broader search)
United States v. Montes‑Reyes, 547 F. Supp. 2d 281 (S.D.N.Y. 2008) (extreme investigatory misrepresentation creating false exigency can render consent involuntary)
Murray v. United States, 487 U.S. 533 (U.S. 1988) (independent‑source doctrine requires later lawful seizure genuinely independent of earlier illegality)
Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (U.S. 1973) (voluntariness of consent judged under totality of circumstances)
Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (U.S. 1991) (scope of consent measured by objective reasonableness of what typical person would have understood)