Redden v. State, 150 A.3d 768

Tyrone Redden was convicted in 2007 of multiple burglaries, thefts, conspiracy, and weapons offenses; sentenced as a habitual offender to 43 years.
At trial the State admitted two out‑of‑court statements under 11 Del. C. § 3507 from Desarie Dennis and Eugene Lai; the prosecutor did not ask either witness on direct whether their prior statements were truthful and defense counsel did not object on that ground.
Dennis initially denied remembering renting a minivan but then, after §3507 testimony, testified she had rented it; Lai identified a codefendant in court and the State introduced his prior identification under §3507.
Redden’s direct appeal was affirmed in 2009; he filed a pro se postconviction motion in 2013 and an amended, counsel‑assisted motion in 2014 raising ineffective assistance claims for failure to object and ineffective appellate counsel for not raising the issue on direct appeal.
The Superior Court denied the amended Rule 61 motion as time‑barred (Rule 61(i)(1)) and successive (Rule 61(i)(2)); the Supreme Court affirmed, holding the Rule 61 bars applied and Redden failed to show a miscarriage of justice under former Rule 61(i)(5).

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Redden’s postconviction motion is timely under Rule 61(i)(1)	Redden argued Rule 61(i)(5) miscarriage‑of‑justice exception applies so timeliness should not bar review	State argued motion was filed >1 year after finality and is time‑barred; miscarriage exception not met	Motion was time‑barred under Rule 61(i)(1); exception not shown
Whether claims are barred as successive under Rule 61(i)(2) and whether ineffective assistance satisfies Rule 61(i)(5)	Redden argued counsel was ineffective for not objecting to §3507 testimony and appellate counsel was ineffective for not raising the claim, satisfying the miscarriage‑of‑justice exception	State argued ineffective assistance alone does not automatically trigger the exception and, on the merits, counsel’s choices were reasonable and no prejudice shown	Claims barred as successive under Rule 61(i)(2); trial and appellate counsel were not shown to be constitutionally ineffective, so Rule 61(i)(5) does not relieve the procedural bars

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (establishes two‑prong ineffective assistance standard)
Flamer v. State, 585 A.2d 736 (Del. 1990) (appellate counsel selection of issues can reflect sound strategy)
Hoskins v. State, 102 A.3d 724 (Del. 2014) (standard of review for postconviction denials)
Neal v. State, 80 A.3d 935 (Del. 2013) (definitions of reasonable probability/prejudice under Strickland)
Ploof v. State, 75 A.3d 811 (Del. 2013) (clarifies review of constitutional and legal questions on postconviction)