226 A.3d 215
Me.2020Background
- Brad Belanger inherited a West Bath cottage (the Camp) in 1976; he married Rebecca Belanger (Belanger) in 1977 and they made an oral 1977 agreement to deed separately owned properties to each other as joint tenants.
- In 1978 Belanger conveyed her Prospect Street property into joint tenancy with Brad; Brad did not then convey the Camp.
- In 2005 Brad deeded the Camp to his daughter Lisa Yorke (Yorke) but Yorke did not record until 2016; neither Yorke nor Brad told Belanger about the 2005 deed.
- In 2016 Brad executed and Belanger recorded a deed making the Camp joint property; Yorke recorded her 2005 deed shortly thereafter; Brad died in August 2016.
- Belanger sued for declaratory relief and slander of title; the trial court granted Yorke partial summary judgment on 33 M.R.S. § 480 and later (on a stipulated record) found no consideration for Brad’s 2016 deed to Belanger, entered final judgment for Yorke; Belanger appealed both rulings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Belanger) | Defendant's Argument (Yorke) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether 33 M.R.S.A. § 480 operates as an affirmative defense to defeat Yorke’s recorded title | §480 required nonowner-spouse signature; where transfer was gratuitous, §480 should function to bar the transferee’s claim to the real estate | §480 is not an affirmative defense to title; it provides claims against proceeds only, and here §480 did not apply | Court affirmed: §480 is not an affirmative defense and provides remedy against proceeds, not a direct property title defense |
| Whether Brad’s 2005 transfer required nonowner-spouse signature because he retained possession/enjoyment at death | Brad retained possession/enjoyment of the Camp at death, so Belanger’s signature was required under §480 | Brad did not retain possession/enjoyment (Camp was used and maintained by Yorke’s family and her husband lived there) | Court held as a matter of law there was no genuine dispute that Brad did not retain possession/enjoyment; §480 did not apply |
| Whether Brad’s 2016 deed to Belanger was supported by consideration (so Belanger was a bona fide purchaser under the recording statute) | The 1977 mutual promises (and Belanger’s 1978 conveyance) constituted bargained‑for consideration for Brad’s later 2016 deed; no new consideration in 2016 was required | Past consideration is not consideration; Belanger supplied no new consideration in 2016 and the trial court correctly found no consideration | Appellate court vacated the trial court’s judgment on this issue and remanded: the trial court applied the wrong legal standard and must determine whether the 1977 promises were bargained‑for consideration |
| Whether the Statute of Frauds or unenforceability of the 1977 agreement defeats a finding of consideration | Even if the 1977 promise was unenforceable, an unenforceable/past promise may still count as consideration for purposes of bona fide purchaser analysis | Statute of Frauds renders the 1977 agreement unenforceable and therefore insufficient to support Brad’s 2016 deed | Court held enforceability under the Statute of Frauds is not dispositive; unenforceable promises can still constitute consideration; trial court erred to rely on the Statute of Frauds alone |
Key Cases Cited
- Grant v. Foster Wheeler, LLC, 140 A.3d 1242 (de novo review of summary judgment explained)
- Rose v. Parsons, 118 A.3d 220 (trial court on stipulated record may draw inferences and decide disputed inferences)
- Christian Fellowship & Renewal Ctr. v. Town of Limington, 896 A.2d 287 (de novo review when parties stipulate to facts)
- Cadwallader v. Clifton R. Shaw, Inc., 142 A. 580 (past consideration principle)
- Hayden v. Russell, 109 A. 485 (past consideration principle)
- Zamore v. Whitten, 395 A.2d 435 (mutual promises as consideration in bilateral contracts)
- Sullivan v. Porter, 861 A.2d 625 (discussion of Statute of Frauds in property-transfer contexts)