Reasner v. State, Department of Health & Social Services, Office of Children's Services
2017 Alas. LEXIS 56
| Alaska | 2017Background
- Lisa Reasner (born 1989) was in OCS custody and placed with the Allison family in 1994; the Allisons adopted her in 1999. She later alleged sexual abuse by Rolin Allison Jr. while in the foster/adoptive home.
- Reports about abuse occurred while OCS had custody (1990s–2000s); Reasner learned in November 2011 from a former OCS caseworker that OCS "knew [J.R.] was dangerous" and had told the adoptive mother to keep him away.
- Reasner filed suit against the Office of Children’s Services (OCS) on December 3, 2012, alleging negligent investigation, supervision/monitoring of the foster home, and negligent post-adoption investigation.
- The superior court granted summary judgment to OCS, ruling Reasner’s claims untimely under the two-year statute of limitations and granting partial judgment on other grounds (discretionary-function immunity; lack of evidence that foster parents missed training).
- The Alaska Supreme Court reversed in part and remanded: holding that material factual disputes exist about accrual (discovery rule), that AS 09.10.065(a) (extended tolling for certain sexual-felony claims) does not apply to negligence suits against non-perpetrators, and that discretionary-function and causation issues were incorrectly resolved at summary judgment in several respects.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| When did Reasner's claims accrue for statute-of-limitations purposes? | Accrual did not occur until Nov. 9, 2011 when a caseworker told her OCS may have known of J.R.'s dangerousness. | A reasonable person knew earlier (by age 18 or from earlier reports) and thus the two-year limitations expired. | Reversed summary judgment; genuine factual dispute exists about accrual and an evidentiary resolution is required. |
| Does AS 09.10.065(a) ("at any time" for certain sexual felonies) extend limitations to claims against OCS? | The statute's wording "for conduct that would have... violated" includes suits against third parties (like OCS) whose negligence allowed abuse. | The statute applies only to suits "for conduct" that constituted the listed felonies (i.e., suits against perpetrators), not negligence claims against non-perpetrators. | Statute does not apply to negligence suit against OCS; plain language and legislative history do not compel broader reading. |
| Does Alaska's statute of repose (AS 09.10.055) bar the claims and may it be held unconstitutional as applied? | The superior court found the repose unconstitutional as applied; plaintiff argued some alleged negligent acts were within 10 years and exceptions may apply. | OCS argued repose bars claims regardless. | Court reversed the as-applied constitutional ruling because the repose may not apply to all asserted acts; lower court must first determine whether repose actually applies before adjudicating constitutionality. |
| Are OCS actions immune under discretionary-function immunity for investigations, visit-frequency policy, ICWA-related procedure failures, and training/supervision claims? | OCS is not immune for certain investigatory and monitoring actions and for failure to ensure foster-parent training; post-1998 minimum-contact policy left no pure discretion. | OCS asserted discretionary-function immunity for many policy-driven decisions (investigations, minimum contacts, ICWA implementation). | Mixed: immunity does not bar negligent investigation claims tied to specific non-discretionary policies (post-1998 minimum-contact language). ICWA-related claims were affirmed as to immunity because plaintiff did not challenge that ground on appeal. There remains a genuine factual dispute about whether foster parents completed required training and causation. |
Key Cases Cited
- Cameron v. State, 822 P.2d 1362 (Alaska 1991) (Alaska's discovery rule for accrual inquiry).
- Mine Safety Appliances Co. v. Stiles, 756 P.2d 288 (Alaska 1988) (applying discovery rule to product-injury accrual).
- Palmer v. Borg-Warner Corp., 818 P.2d 632 (Alaska 1990) (inquiry notice may begin at injury date when circumstances reasonably suggest negligence by particular kinds of defendants).
- Catholic Bishop of N. Alaska v. Does 1-6, 141 P.3d 719 (Alaska 2006) (discovery-rule accrual is fact question; institutional-defendant claims not barred as a matter of law at pleading stage).
- Christensen v. Alaska Sales & Serv., Inc., 335 P.3d 514 (Alaska 2014) (summary-judgment standards; lenient view toward nonmovant).
- Mullins v. State, Dep’t of Health & Soc. Servs., 328 P.3d 1038 (Alaska 2014) (discretionary-function immunity principles).
- Cowles v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 151 P.3d 353 (Alaska 2006) (discussing judicial review of immunity issues).