RAYSHAWN CLARK, DWAYNE HILTON and PERNELL LEE v. UNITED STATES
147 A.3d 318
| D.C. | 2016Background
- In the early morning of June 17, 2012, Cornell Scott was robbed at gunpoint at his front yard; his truck was driven off by a third man while two men held him at gunpoint. A passerby, Tyaron Scott, was also robbed. The robbers returned shortly after to recover a cell phone left at the scene, during which Cornell was again threatened and had a phone taken from him. An SUV fled, crashed, and occupants were apprehended; police recovered personal effects and firearms from the wreck and Hilton’s phone was tied to the scene.
- Defendants Rayshawn Clark, Dwayne Hilton, and Pernell Lee were charged with conspiracy, multiple armed robberies, an armed carjacking, and related firearm offenses; juries convicted Clark and Hilton on conspiracy, carjacking, several robberies, and PFCV counts; Lee was convicted of fewer counts. Sentences: Clark 31 years; Hilton 25 years; Lee ~8 years 8 months.
- During trial, victim Cornell initially could not identify the robbers but later contacted the lead detective and reported a “refreshed recollection”; on subsequent testimony he identified Clark and Lee in-court. The court prevented the prosecution from eliciting the refreshed-identification on direct and refused to allow cross-exam about the detective call; Cornell made the identifications on cross-examination.
- Hilton and Lee challenged sufficiency of the evidence for carjacking and for liability for the second robbery, arguing lack of immediate possession (carjacking) and that the second robbery was not a foreseeable act of the conspiracy.
- The court affirmed convictions, holding any identification error harmless, that Sutton controls the carjacking analysis (victim’s proximity satisfied “immediate actual possession”), and that co-conspirator liability or a limited subsidiary conspiracy to recover the phone made the second robbery foreseeable. The case was remanded only for merger of certain PFCV counts.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Admissibility of Cornell’s in-court IDs after his post-direct-call to detective | Prosecution: IDs admissible; victim’s refreshed recollection credible and disclosed; any error harmless | Clark: IDs unreliable because based on a late “refreshed recollection” and the call to detective violated sequestration; should have excluded or sanctioned | Any error harmless: jury knew he initially could not ID; strong independent evidence tied Clark to the scene; court prevented direct elicitation and conviction unaffected |
| Sufficiency — carjacking “immediate actual possession” element | Government: Cornell was ~10 feet from truck and restrained at gunpoint — satisfied immediate actual possession | Hilton: Truck not in Cornell’s actual possession because he had begun to walk to his door; Sutton should be distinguished or overruled | Affirmed under Sutton: proximity/ability to prevent taking (10 feet) satisfies immediate actual possession |
| Sufficiency — liability for second robbery (co-conspirator/subsidiary conspiracy) | Government: evidence of conspiracy and foreseeability; defendants liable for foreseeable acts in furtherance of primary or subsidiary plan (recover phone) | Hilton/Lee: Second robbery was a separate, discrete event; not a foreseeable result of the initial robberies; no agreement to commit second robbery | Affirmed: evidence supports a limited subsidiary conspiracy to recover the phone; second robbery was foreseeable (armed co-conspirator confronting victim) and defendants liable |
| Miscellaneous trial rulings (competency inquiry, surprise in-court ID by Tyaron, limitations on cross-exam about Hilton’s phone, jury instruction) | Government: trial court acted within discretion on competency, identifications, relevance rulings, and jury note reply | Defendants: trial court should have sua sponte ordered competency eval; should have granted mistrial or relief for surprise ID; cross-exam improperly limited; jury instruction coerced unanimity | All rulings affirmed: no abuse of discretion on competence (no compelling red flags); surprise ID not prejudicial; cross-exam relevance properly limited; jury note reply was proper and not coercive; remand only for merger of PFCV counts |
Key Cases Cited
- Sutton v. United States, 988 A.2d 478 (D.C. 2010) (defines "immediate actual possession" by proximity and ability to prevent vehicle taking)
- Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (due process does not require pre-admission reliability screening of eyewitness IDs absent state misconduct)
- Wilson-Bey v. United States, 903 A.2d 818 (D.C. 2006) (elements of co-conspirator liability and foreseeability of substantive crimes)
- Snowden v. United States, 52 A.3d 858 (D.C. 2012) (co-conspirator liability for foreseeable deviations in carrying out plan)
- Powell v. United States, 469 U.S. 57 (1984) (inconsistent jury verdicts do not permit reversal; jury verdicts insulated from consistency review)