579 F.Supp.3d 327
N.D.N.Y.2022Background
- New York's Shock Incarceration Program (SIP) is a rigorous 6-month rehabilitative program that can make participants eligible for immediate conditional release; DOCCS administers SIP under statutory directives.
- In 2009 the legislature allowed sentencing courts to order drug offenders into SIP and required DOCCS to provide an alternative for inmates who are sentenced into SIP but are medically or mentally ineligible.
- DOCCS uses the Comprehensive Alcohol and Substance Abuse Treatment program (CASAT) as the alternative; ordinarily CASAT graduates transfer to work release, but only inmates judicially ordered into the court-directed alternative can earn full release after six months.
- DOCCS policy excludes inmates with certain medical conditions or mental health levels from SIP (e.g., insulin-dependent diabetes, mental-health levels requiring medication); plaintiffs Raymond and Garcia were screened, transferred, then rejected from SIP due to such conditions.
- Plaintiffs sued under Title II of the ADA and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, alleging the system requires disabled inmates to be judicially sentenced into SIP to access the six-month early-release pathway while non-disabled inmates may volunteer, and moved to certify a statewide class under Rule 23(b)(2).
- The court granted certification: it found numerosity, commonality, typicality, adequacy, ascertainability, and standing satisfied and certified a Rule 23(b)(2) class of inmates excluded from SIP for medical/mental reasons who are otherwise eligible but not judicially ordered into SIP.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Numerosity: are class numbers impracticable to join? | Thousands were excluded from SIP for impairments (4,427 from 2015-2019), so joinder is impracticable. | Many excluded inmates might have been judicially ordered into SIP, reducing class size. | Numerosity satisfied; likely well over 40 and impracticable to join. |
| Commonality: is there a common question capable of classwide resolution? | Yes — DOCCS policy/systemically requires disabled inmates to be judicially ordered into SIP to access the 6-month early-release pathway while non-disabled inmates may volunteer. | Exclusions are highly individualized; like Dukes, no uniform discriminatory policy. | Commonality satisfied: plaintiffs challenge a uniform administrative structure, not individualized exclusions. |
| Typicality: do plaintiffs’ claims mirror the class claims? | Plaintiffs challenge the same policy that deprives disabled inmates of the volunteer route to early release; their claims arise from same course of conduct. | Individualized medical issues and eligibility determinations undermine typicality. | Typicality satisfied, especially because requested relief is injunctive/declaratory. |
| Adequacy: can named plaintiffs and counsel fairly and vigorously represent class? | Plaintiffs and Prisoners’ Legal Services will vigorously pursue class claims; no conflicts with class members. | Defendants assert potential conflicts (e.g., differing disabilities) but offer no concrete antagonistic interests. | Adequacy satisfied; no antagonistic interests identified. |
| Ascertainability: can class membership be defined with objective criteria? | Yes — members are those (1) incarcerated or to be incarcerated in NY state prisons, (2) not judicially ordered into SIP, (3) disqualified from SIP for medical/mental reasons, (4) otherwise eligible, and (5) denied an alternative 6-month pathway. | Determining whether an impairment qualifies as an ADA disability for each member undermines ascertainability. | Ascertainability satisfied: requirement is modest; objective criteria exist and Rule 23(b)(2) injunction reduces need for precise membership lists. |
| Standing: do class members have Article III and statutory standing for injunctive relief? | Yes — DOCCS policies bar certain impairments from SIP; exclusion is ongoing or would be futile to challenge, satisfying injury, causation, and redressability. | Some putative members may not yet have been rejected and thus lack a concrete injury. | Standing satisfied: class limited to persons excluded or who would be per se excluded; futility doctrine and ongoing policies establish a real and imminent threat. |
| Rule 23(b)(2) suitability: does defendant act/refuse to act on grounds generally applicable to the class and is injunctive/declaratory relief appropriate? | Yes — a single institutional injunction would redress the class because the challenged policy is uniform and statewide. | Individualized issues and manageability concerns make class relief inappropriate. | 23(b)(2) certification granted: a single injunction would address the common policy and benefit all class members. |
Key Cases Cited
- Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338 (class commonality requires a common contention capable of classwide resolution)
- Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 569 U.S. 27 (class certification may require analysis overlapping the merits)
- In re Petrobras Securities, 862 F.3d 250 (ascertainability requires objective criteria; modest threshold)
- Denney v. Deutsche Bank AG, 443 F.3d 253 (class must be defined so members have standing)
- Henrietta D. v. Bloomberg, 331 F.3d 261 (Title II and the Rehabilitation Act require meaningful access to public benefits)
- Kreisler v. Second Ave. Diner Corp., 731 F.3d 184 (standing elements for ADA injunctive relief explained)
- Amchem Products, Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (adequacy inquiry to uncover conflicts of interest among class members)
- Tyson Foods, Inc. v. Bouaphakeo, 577 U.S. 442 (distinction between Rule 23(b)(3) predominance and (b)(2) considerations)
- Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (Article III standing elements)
- Jackson-Bey v. Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091 (futility doctrine: need not apply when a facially applicable policy makes application futile)