Raymond Ross v.
2017 U.S. App. LEXIS 10004
| 3rd Cir. | 2017Background
- Raymond Ross filed multiple Chapter 13 petitions to stop recurring sheriff’s sales of the Rosses’ home; his first Chapter 13 was involuntarily dismissed, and his second (the one on appeal) was filed the day of a scheduled sale.
- AmeriChoice moved to convert or dismiss Raymond’s case under § 1307(c) for alleged bad faith; a hearing was set, Raymond sought postponement then requested voluntary dismissal under § 1307(b) and did not appear at the hearing.
- The Bankruptcy Court dismissed Raymond’s case “with prejudice” and entered a broad filing injunction barring Raymond from filing any future bankruptcy case without express court permission (no temporal or geographic limits).
- AmeriChoice separately sought and obtained a narrower 180-day filing bar and carve-out of the automatic stay against the property in Sandra Ross’s case; she did not further appeal.
- The Third Circuit held that bankruptcy courts have authority under § 105(a) and inherent powers to issue filing injunctions even where a debtor requests dismissal under § 1307(b), but vacated Raymond’s injunction and remanded because the injunction was overly broad and the Bankruptcy Court gave no reasoning for its scope.
Issues
| Issue | Ross’s Argument | AmeriChoice’s Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a bankruptcy court may issue a filing injunction when a Chapter 13 debtor requests voluntary dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) | § 1307(b) gives an absolute right to dismissal; a filing injunction cannot be imposed because it would defeat that statutory right | Courts may attach conditions or otherwise restrict filings under § 105(a)/inherent authority; nothing in § 1307(b)’s text expressly forbids a filing injunction | Court: Bankruptcy courts may issue filing injunctions in this context; nothing in § 1307(b) expressly precludes such orders (aligns with Marrama reasoning) |
| Whether the Bankruptcy Court abused its discretion in entering Raymond’s broad, indefinite filing injunction | The injunction is invalid and procedurally deficient; it undermines statutory protections and Ross’s rights | The injunction was justified by Ross’s pattern of filings and needed to prevent abuse of the bankruptcy process | Court: Abuse of discretion — injunction vacated and remanded because it was broader than requested, harsher than the one entered against Sandra, lacked temporal/geographic limits, and the court provided no reasoning; 180 days may have sufficed |
Key Cases Cited
- Law v. Siegel, 134 S. Ct. 1188 (2014) (limits on bankruptcy equitable powers where order conflicts with explicit Code text)
- Marrama v. Citizens Bank, 549 U.S. 365 (2007) (upholding bankruptcy court authority to restrict debtor conduct where Code text does not prohibit)
- In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190 (3d Cir. 2004) (equitable powers of bankruptcy courts are not unlimited)
- Abdul-Akbar v. Watson, 901 F.2d 329 (3d Cir. 1990) (issuance of filing injunctions is discretionary)
- In re Packer Ave. Assocs., 884 F.2d 745 (3d Cir. 1989) (broad filing injunctions are extreme remedies that must be narrowly tailored)