948 F.3d 164
3rd Cir.2020Background:
- Raymond Holloway pled guilty in 2005 to a Pennsylvania second DUI with a BAC of 0.192% under 75 Pa. Stat. § 3802(c) (graded as a first‑degree misdemeanor because it was a repeat offense), received a 90‑day custodial, work‑release sentence and fines.
- Because the offense carried a possible five‑year maximum, it qualifies as a crime "punishable by imprisonment for a term exceeding one year" under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20)(B), triggering the federal firearms prohibition in 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1).
- Holloway sued, arguing § 922(g)(1) is unconstitutional as applied to him; the district court granted summary judgment and enjoined enforcement of § 922(g)(1) against him.
- On appeal the Third Circuit applied the Marzzarella two‑step framework as refined by the en banc Binderup decision: step one asks whether the prior conviction was a "serious" offense that historically disqualified a person from Second Amendment protection; if not, the challenger proceeds and the government must satisfy heightened scrutiny at step two.
- The majority held Holloway’s DUI conviction is a "serious" crime under Binderup (emphasizing DUI’s danger, Pennsylvania’s grading and maximum penalty, mandatory minimum and legislative history), so Holloway failed at step one and § 922(g)(1) is constitutional as applied; the court reversed the district court.
- Judge Fisher dissented: he would apply the Binderup multifactor test and conclude Holloway’s misdemeanor classification, the light actual sentence, and cross‑jurisdictional sentencing practices weigh in Holloway’s favor; applying intermediate scrutiny, the dissent found § 922(g)(1) underinclusive and unconstitutional as applied.
Issues:
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether applying 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) to Holloway violates the Second Amendment | Holloway: his DUI was non‑serious/non‑historically disqualifying; he poses no current risk; government produced insufficient safety evidence | Government: a repeat, high‑BAC DUI is dangerous and reflects the kind of conduct historically used to disarm; state grading and penalty show seriousness | Majority: Holloway’s offense is "serious" under Binderup; § 922(g)(1) applies and is constitutional as applied (reversed district court) |
| How to decide whether an offense is "serious" at Marzzarella step one | Holloway: apply Binderup’s multifactor comparison (classification, elements, sentence, cross‑jurisdictional consensus); these factors favor Holloway | Government/Majority: consider danger/risk of harm, legislative grading and maximum penalty and legislative history as probative of seriousness | Majority: factors (danger, mandatory minimum, 5‑year max, legislative intent) show seriousness; Holloway fails step one; Dissent: multifactor test points opposite |
| If step one is met, whether § 922(g)(1) survives heightened scrutiny (intermediate) | Holloway: even if burdened, § 922(g)(1) is underinclusive and the government’s evidence does not justify permanent disarmament | Government: Congress may bar possession by those convicted of crimes punishable by >1 year; evidence about recidivist DUI risks and alcohol/drug problems supports the fit | Majority: did not reach step two because Holloway failed step one; Dissent: applies intermediate scrutiny and finds § 922(g)(1) unconstitutionally underinclusive as applied |
Key Cases Cited
- District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (Second Amendment protects law‑abiding, responsible citizens’ right to possess arms; longstanding felon disarmament upheld as presumptively lawful)
- United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85 (3d Cir. 2010) (announces two‑step test for Second Amendment challenges: scope then means‑ends scrutiny)
- Binderup v. Attorney Gen. United States of America, 836 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2016) (en banc) (as‑applied framework: focus on whether prior conviction was a "serious" offense; intermediate scrutiny at step two)
- United States v. Barton, 633 F.3d 168 (3d Cir. 2011) (earlier as‑applied approach emphasizing violence/danger; largely superseded by Binderup)
- Beers v. Attorney Gen. U.S., 927 F.3d 150 (3d Cir. 2019) (applies Binderup holdings to as‑applied Second Amendment challenges)
- Ass’n of N.J. Rifle & Pistol Clubs v. Att’y Gen. N.J., 910 F.3d 106 (3d Cir. 2018) (Second Amendment intermediate‑scrutiny analysis in regulatory context)
- Holloway v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 451 (M.D. Pa. 2018) (district court decision granting Holloway declaratory relief and injunctive relief under § 922(g)(1); reversed on appeal)
- Begay v. United States, 553 U.S. 137 (2008) (discusses seriousness of drunk driving in criminal‑history context)
- Mitchell v. Wisconsin, 139 S. Ct. 2525 (2019) (acknowledges the grave dangers of drunk driving)