Raymond Gray v. William Kern
702 F. App'x 132
| 4th Cir. | 2017Background
- In February 2013 at a Baltimore Police Department Simunition tactical training at Rosewood, instructor Officer William Kern (armed with a loaded service Glock) shot trainee Raymond Gray in the head, causing catastrophic brain injury.
- Simunition (blue training) weapons are visually distinct and live (black) service weapons are prohibited in training; Kern had his live weapon in his holster and his blue Simunition gun in his pocket.
- Officer Efren Edwards was the co-instructor; Edwards says he did not agree to Kern being armed, performed weapons-checks, and would have required disarmament or halted training had he known.
- Kern claimed he intended to fire his Simunition weapon to ‘‘teach’’ about dangerous doorways but accidentally fired his live weapon; Edwards disputes Kern’s account and recounts earlier incidents that suggested Kern knowingly carried a live gun and treated Black trainees poorly.
- Criminally, Kern was convicted of reckless endangerment; civilly, the Grays sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (excessive force and substantive due process), Monell failure-to-train, Maryland constitutional claim, negligence/gross negligence, several intentional torts, and loss of consortium.
- The district court granted summary judgment to Kern on the § 1983 claims (adopting Kern’s ‘‘accident’’ account), granted summary judgment to Edwards and Major Russell on all claims, and dismissed state claims as moot after the City deposited $200,000 under the Local Government Tort Claims Act. The Grays appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fourth Amendment excessive-force claim (intentional seizure) survives | Gray: evidence supports that Kern intentionally shot him with a live weapon, so a seizure occurred | Kern: he intended to fire Simunition and accidentally used the live gun, so no intent to seize | Affirmed for defendants — Fourth Amendment does not apply because the shooting was unrelated to a criminal-justice seizure objective |
| Whether Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process claim survives (conscience-shocking conduct) | Gray: evidence could show arbitrary, egregious, intentional conduct shocking the conscience | Kern: accidental firing negates intent to injure required for conscience-shocking conduct | Vacated and reinstated — triable issue exists whether Kern acted with intent/actual malice to shock the conscience |
| Whether Monell failure-to-train claim against Baltimore Police Dept. survives | Gray: if Kern’s misconduct is intentional, municipal failure to train may be liable | City: district court relied on Kern summary judgment to defeat Monell claim | Vacated and reinstated along with substantive due process claim (Monell may proceed if evidence supports intentional misconduct) |
| Whether gross negligence claim against Officer Edwards survives | Gray: under Kern’s claim of an agreement, Edwards may have acquiesced recklessly (or Edwards’ own conduct could be grossly negligent) | Edwards: he was not in authority to order Kern to disarm; at most negligent | Vacated as to Edwards — factual dispute (Edwards’ testimony contradicts Kern) requires trial; affirmed as to Major Russell (no supporting evidence) |
| Whether state-law claims against Kern and Commissioner Batts were properly dismissed as moot via $200,000 LGCA deposit (actual malice exception) | Gray: sufficient evidence exists to show Kern acted with actual malice (ill will/improper motive) so cap may not apply | Defendants: evidence shows accidental shooting so no actual malice; $200,000 cap limits recovery and moots claims | Vacated and reinstated — jury could find actual malice, so state claims should proceed and applicability of cap remains live |
Key Cases Cited
- Brower v. Cty. of Inyo, 489 U.S. 593 (U.S. 1989) (seizure requires the instrumentality set in motion to stop a person)
- Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103 (U.S. 1975) (Fourth Amendment tailored for criminal-justice seizures)
- County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833 (U.S. 1998) (substantive due process requires conscience-shocking conduct for certain claims)
- Waybright v. Frederick Cty., 528 F.3d 199 (4th Cir. 2008) (presumption against § 1983 due process claims overlapping tort law; overcome by conscience-shocking intent)
- Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (U.S. 1978) (municipal liability for failure to train)
- Bauer v. Lynch, 812 F.3d 340 (4th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for summary judgment)
- Barbre v. Pope, 935 A.2d 699 (Md. 2007) (definition and standard for gross negligence under Maryland law)
- Rounds v. Md.-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n, 109 A.3d 639 (Md. 2015) (discussing Maryland Local Government Tort Claims Act liability limits and employee protections)
- Wall v. Wade, 741 F.3d 492 (4th Cir. 2014) (de novo review of dismissal as moot by deposit under state tort-cap statute)