Raymond Curtis Branch v. Lauren Hoover Branch
174 So. 3d 932
| Miss. Ct. App. | 2015Background
- Raymond (Curt) and Lauren Branch married in 1999 and had two children (2002, 2004); marital problems arose after Curt began an extramarital relationship in 2011.
- Lauren filed for divorce in November 2011; the chancellor granted a divorce on grounds of adultery in September 2013 and entered final judgment in November 2013.
- The chancery court awarded Lauren sole legal and physical custody, Curt visitation (with Curt to pay transportation costs), child support ($1,800/month), and rehabilitative alimony ($1,000/month for 72 months).
- The court allocated marital property and debts (Curt kept business assets and retirement; Lauren received home equity), imputed income to Curt for support calculations, and ordered Curt to pay 75% of children’s education costs and maintain life insurance.
- The chancellor awarded Lauren $28,242.95 in attorney’s fees; the Court of Appeals affirmed and awarded Lauren $14,121.48 in appellate attorney’s fees.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Curt) | Defendant's Argument (Lauren) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Sole legal custody | Chancellor erred by granting sole legal custody based on Lauren’s objection to joint custody rather than best interests | Best interests (Albright factors) supported Lauren having sole legal custody | Affirmed: chancellor applied Albright factors and properly exercised discretion; joint custody inappropriate given animosity |
| Visitation & transportation costs | Visitation schedule impractical due to long travel; travel cost requirement interferes with relationship | Visitation schedule is liberal and transportation was discretionary for chancellor | Affirmed: schedule met minimum liberal visitation standards; transportation allocation within chancellor’s discretion (modification possible later) |
| Child support calculation | Chancellor miscalculated adjusted gross income and failed to account for taxes/expenses | Chancellor may impute income and use non-tax gross-income measures; Curt failed to produce sufficient financial records | Affirmed: chancellor reasonably imputed $117,000 annual income based on evidence and computed support ($1,800/mo) |
| Property division (Nashville Smiles) | Business formed after temporary order should be separate property and not factored into division | Chancellor primarily used business only to assess Curt’s earning capacity; division was equitable | Affirmed: no reversible error—classification/valuation within chancellor’s discretion and division not inequitable |
| Alimony | Alimony improper because of incorrect income assessment | Rehabilitative alimony appropriate under Armstrong factors to enable Lauren to become self-supporting | Affirmed: alimony award supported by Armstrong analysis and facts (stay-at-home mother, needs, fault) |
| Attorney’s fees | Chancellor failed to consider Curt’s ability to pay and that Lauren’s parents paid fees | Lauren lacked ability to pay; fees reasonable and necessary | Affirmed: award within chancellor’s discretion though findings could be fuller; appellate fees awarded ($14,121.48) |
Key Cases Cited
- Lowrey v. Lowrey, 25 So. 3d 274 (Miss. 2009) (presumption favoring joint custody where parents agree; definition of legal custody)
- Albright v. Albright, 437 So. 2d 1003 (Miss. 1983) (factors for child-custody best-interest analysis)
- Armstrong v. Armstrong, 618 So. 2d 1278 (Miss. 1993) (factors for awarding alimony)
- Ferguson v. Ferguson, 639 So. 2d 921 (Miss. 1994) (factors for equitable division of marital property)
- Hemsley v. Hemsley, 639 So. 2d 909 (Miss. 1994) (classification of marital vs. separate property; not required to liquidate assets to pay fees)
- McKee v. McKee, 418 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1982) (factors for awarding attorney’s fees)
- Nix v. Nix, 790 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 2001) (chancellor may consider expenditures and earning capacity when determining support)
- Swiderski v. Swiderski, 18 So. 3d 280 (Miss. Ct. App. 2009) (chancellor may factor skepticism about a party’s veracity and impute potential earning capacity)