Raymond Cross v. Mark Fox, 23 F.4th 797

Raymond Cross and co-plaintiff Marilyn Hudson are enrolled members of the Three Affiliated Tribes (TAT); Cross lives off-reservation and sought an absentee ballot for a 2018 tribal election but was denied under a tribal constitution provision requiring nonresidents to return to the reservation to vote.
The TAT constitution also contains a provision disqualifying nonresidents from holding tribal office.
Cross and Hudson initially sued in tribal court; the tribal trial court granted summary judgment for the Tribe and the tribal supreme court affirmed except as to one equal-protection issue remanded to tribal court.
While the tribal proceedings were ongoing, Cross and Hudson filed a federal suit seeking declaratory and injunctive relief under Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (VRA) and the Indian Civil Rights Act (ICRA).
The district court dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction (citing failure to exhaust tribal remedies for ICRA claims and concluding the VRA does not cover tribes); Cross appealed.
The Eighth Circuit affirmed, holding Cross lacked standing to challenge the office-eligibility rule, the VRA claim was foreclosed by precedent because tribes are not "States or political subdivisions," and the ICRA does not authorize declaratory or injunctive suits in federal court.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Standing to challenge nonresident office-eligibility rule	Cross argued the eligibility bar injured him as a nonresident tribal member	Tribe argued Cross lacked concrete intent to run and therefore lacked Article III standing	No standing—Cross did not allege he was ‘‘able and ready’’ or likely to run for office
Whether the VRA applies to Indian tribes (§ 1331 jurisdiction)	Cross argued § 2 of the VRA forbids the return-to-reservation voting rule and authorizes federal relief	Tribe argued the VRA applies only to States and political subdivisions, not tribes	VRA claim dismissed as patently meritless under controlling precedent—tribes are not covered
Whether ICRA permits declaratory or injunctive federal suits	Cross sought declaratory/injunctive relief under ICRA for due process/equal protection violations	Tribe argued plaintiffs must exhaust tribal remedies and ICRA does not provide federal civil remedies other than habeas	ICRA does not authorize declaratory or injunctive federal suits; no § 1331 jurisdiction
Failure to exhaust tribal remedies	Cross relied on federal court jurisdiction to bypass tribal forum	Tribe emphasized plaintiffs did not exhaust tribal remedies after tribal-court proceedings	District court’s exhaustion ruling affirmed on alternative jurisdictional grounds (no federal cause of action)

United States v. Hays, 515 U.S. 737 (1995) (federal courts must independently assess Article III standing)
Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368 (2012) (when a claim arises under federal law requires a federal cause of action)
Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500 (2006) (distinguishing jurisdictional limits from elements of a claim)
Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49 (1978) (ICRA does not authorize declaratory or injunctive federal remedies)
Wounded Head v. Tribal Council of Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Rsrv., 507 F.2d 1079 (8th Cir. 1975) (VRA provisions applying to states and political subdivisions do not apply to Indian tribes)
Biscanin v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 407 F.3d 905 (8th Cir. 2005) (patently meritless/substantial-question standard for federal-question jurisdiction)
Perpetual Securities, Inc. v. Tang, 290 F.3d 132 (2d Cir. 2002) (clear precedent can render asserted federal claims patently meritless)