Ray v. Weit
708 F. App'x 719
| 2d Cir. | 2017Background
- Shelda Ray, pro se, sued the NYC Department of Education and an individual alleging employment discrimination under Title VII and the ADA; the district court dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6).
- On appeal, this Court retained only Ray’s ADA failure-to-accommodate claim based on alleged visual impairment; other claims were dismissed previously.
- Ray alleged multiple impairments (asthma, podiatric issues, and 99% vision loss in one eye) and sought accommodations including locker/work location changes and a modified work schedule starting later.
- The employer terminated Ray for chronic tardiness; Ray attributed lateness to her visual impairment and inability to leave before sunrise, and claimed the DOE refused her requested schedule accommodation.
- The district court dismissed all ADA failure-to-accommodate claims; the Second Circuit reviewed that dismissal de novo.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Ray sufficiently pleaded disability-based failure to accommodate under the ADA for asthma/podiatric issues | Ray sought non-cold/damp locker/work area and no-stairs assignments to accommodate conditions | Employer contended accommodations were unrelated to essential job functions or termination reason | Dismissed: court affirmed dismissal as those accommodations did not relate to job performance or termination (tardiness) |
| Whether Ray sufficiently pleaded disability-based failure to accommodate under the ADA for vision loss | Ray alleged 99% vision loss in one eye impeded seeing before sunrise, causing tardiness; sought a later start time | Employer argued judicially-noticeable facts (sunrise times, one-hour commute) show vision could not explain lateness | Vacated and remanded: pleading was sufficient to raise plausible claim that vision-related limitation affected arrival time; factual disputes inappropriate at dismissal stage |
| Whether "seeing" is a major life activity and whether commuting/working are necessarily the relevant activity | Ray framed the limitation as affecting commute/arrival; she argued need for modified schedule | Employer treated commuting/working as the activity and argued no substantial limitation | Court held "seeing" is the relevant major life activity here and plaintiff alleged enough to plausibly show substantial limitation with respect to arriving at work |
| Whether modified schedule can be a reasonable accommodation | Ray sought a modified start time to accommodate limited vision in darkness | Employer argued schedule change was unnecessary or unrelated | Held: modified schedules can be reasonable accommodations; plaintiff pleaded enough to warrant discovery on whether schedule was reasonable and essential functions could be met |
Key Cases Cited
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) (pleading must state plausible claim)
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) (court need not accept legal conclusions)
- McBride v. BIC Consumer Prods. Mfg. Co., 583 F.3d 92 (2d Cir. 2009) (elements of ADA failure-to-accommodate claim)
- McMillan v. New York City, 711 F.3d 120 (2d Cir. 2013) (fixed arrival time not always an essential job function)
- Rodal v. Anesthesia Group of Onondaga, P.C., 369 F.3d 113 (2d Cir. 2004) (modified work schedule may be reasonable accommodation)