Ray v. State, 280 A.3d 627

Background

On May 21, 2012, Craig Melancon was shot three times and later died; two hooded men fled the scene. Tyare Lee (co-defendant) later pleaded guilty and testified that he and Reuel Ray attempted to rob Melancon and that Ray fired multiple shots.
Key evidence: Lee’s testimony, eyewitness accounts (Anthony Coursey, Marla Johnson), jailhouse/phone statements by Ray, Ray’s post-event efforts to sell/sell-back a .38 revolver, and recovery of a .38 handgun at Darren Lamotte’s residence.
At trial the court instructed the jury on felony murder using pre‑2004 statutory language (“in the course of and in furtherance of”) and referenced accomplice liability without giving a proper accomplice‑liability instruction; neither party objected at trial or on direct appeal.
Ray was convicted of felony murder (life sentence), attempted robbery, conspiracy, firearm counts, and related offenses; this Court affirmed on direct appeal in 2017.
Ray filed a Rule 61 postconviction motion alleging (1) Brady violation — nondisclosure that witness Jonda Tann’s felony charge had been dismissed before trial, and (2) ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to object to the erroneous felony‑murder/accomplice instructions and for failing to raise the issue on appeal.
The Superior Court denied relief; the Delaware Supreme Court (majority) held counsel was ineffective for failing to challenge the erroneous instruction and granted a new trial on the felony‑murder count and its related firearm count, but rejected Brady‑based relief for the remaining convictions.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Was counsel ineffective for failing to object to the trial court’s outdated felony‑murder instruction (and for not raising it on direct appeal)?	Ray: Counsel unreasonably failed to notice/object to a clearly incorrect instruction (including an unexplained accomplice‑liability theory); this omission prejudiced him under Strickland.	State: Instruction was “outdated” but sufficient; failure to object/appeal did not undermine confidence in the verdict.	Held: Yes. Counsel’s failure was objectively unreasonable and prejudice is shown because the flawed instruction (and unaddressed accomplice theory) likely would have led to reversal on direct appeal under plain‑error review; grant new trial on felony murder and related firearm count.
2. Did the erroneous instruction itself create plain error that would have warranted reversal on direct appeal?	Ray: Instruction misstated the post‑2004 statute and introduced accomplice liability without explanation, imperiling fairness and verdict integrity.	State/Superior Ct.: The old language arguably imposed a higher burden on the State and thus benefitted Ray or was harmless given the evidence.	Held: The instruction was materially incorrect and injected an accomplice liability theory without guidance; a majority would have found plain error on direct appeal.
3. Did the State violate Brady by failing to disclose that witness Jonda Tann’s felony charge was dismissed before trial, and was that nondisclosure material?	Ray: The dismissal was impeachment evidence that would have undermined Tann’s credibility and reasonably affected the verdict.	State: Concedes nondisclosure was error but argues no Brady prejudice because independent, overwhelming evidence supported convictions.	Held: Although nondisclosure occurred, the withheld evidence was not material in the Brady sense; the remaining record (Lee, Coursey, Johnson, forensics, admissions) leaves no reasonable probability of a different outcome on the non‑felony‑murder counts. Brady relief denied as to those convictions.

Key Cases Cited

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two‑prong ineffective‑assistance test: deficient performance + prejudice)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecutor’s duty to disclose exculpatory/impeaching evidence)
Williams v. State, 818 A.2d 906 (Del. 2003) (interpreting pre‑amendment “in the course of and in furtherance of” language for felony murder)
Johnson v. State, 711 A.2d 18 (Del. 1998) (requirements for instructing jury on accomplice liability and the two‑step analysis)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality standard for suppressed evidence under Brady)
Bullock v. State, 775 A.2d 1043 (Del. 2001) (purpose and required particularity of jury instructions)