Ray v. State, 2017 Ark. App. 574

Wayne Travis Ray pleaded guilty in 1999 to first-degree sexual abuse in Saline County and was also convicted days later in Pulaski County of the same offense against the same victim; the sentences ran concurrently.
Ray was required to register as a sex offender and, in April 2016, petitioned under Ark. Code Ann. § 12-12-919 to terminate his registration after 15 years post-release.
§ 12-12-919 permits termination after 15 years for qualifying offenders but (after Act 1743 of 2001) mandates lifetime registration for certain categories, including those convicted of a second or subsequent sex offense under a separate case number.
Ray argued the lifetime-registration provision was unconstitutional as applied to him under the federal and state equal-protection clauses and as an ex post facto law because his convictions predated the 2001 amendment.
The State and the Attorney General opposed relief; the circuit court denied Ray’s petition and upheld the statute as nonpunitive and rationally related to legislative objectives.
The Arkansas Court of Appeals affirmed, rejecting both Ray’s equal-protection and ex post facto challenges.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Equal protection challenge to lifetime-registration classification	Ray: Treating offenders convicted in multiple case numbers as categorically ineligible for termination is arbitrary where his multiple convictions arose from the same victim and geography; he poses no greater risk.	State: Legislature rationally may treat persons with convictions in separate cases as higher risk; classification need only be rationally related to a legitimate objective.	Court: Classification meets rational-basis review; statute does not violate equal protection.
Ex post facto challenge to application of lifetime registration to pre‑amendment convictions	Ray: Applying the 2001 lifetime-registration amendment to him increases punishment after the fact and is therefore barred as ex post facto.	State: The statute is regulatory/civil (not punitive); Kellar and Parkman control, and subsequent amendments did not render the scheme punitive.	Court: Statute remains regulatory in purpose and effect; not an ex post facto violation.

Kellar v. Fayetteville Police Dep’t, 339 Ark. 274 (1999) (court held Sex Offender Registration Act essentially regulatory, not punitive, and not ex post facto)
Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) (multi-factor test for determining whether civil sanctions are punitive)
Parkman v. Sex Offender Screening & Risk Assessment Comm., 2009 Ark. 205 (court held later statutory amendments did not convert the scheme into punishment)
Brown v. State, 2015 Ark. 16 (applies deferential rational-basis review to sex-offender registry classifications)
Landers v. Stone, 2016 Ark. 272 (underinclusiveness of a classification does not render it unconstitutional)