Ray v. State, 165 A.3d 408

Ray pleaded not guilty on an agreed statement of facts to conspiracy to commit theft and making a false statement; two other counts were nolle prossed per a written plea-agreement memorandum signed by counsel.
The memorandum stated: “Cap of four years on any executed incarceration.” The memorandum and an advice-of-rights form (signed by Ray) also showed the maximum statutory exposure: 10 years + 6 months.
At the plea hearing the court recited the agreement (including the “cap of four years on executed incarceration”), accepted the agreed statement of facts, and found Ray guilty on the two counts.
At sentencing the court imposed 10 years, suspending 6 years, with 4 years executed and 4 years’ supervised probation — i.e., 4 years "hard time" plus suspended time.
Ray moved to correct an illegal sentence under Md. Rule 4-345(a), arguing the court exceeded the bargained-for maximum (he and a reasonable lay person would have understood the total sentence could not exceed four years). The trial court denied relief; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed.

Issue	Ray's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Whether the plea agreement’s phrase “cap of four years on any executed incarceration” limited total sentence to 4 years (no suspended time)	Ray: A lay person would understand the cap to limit the total sentence to four years; suspended time plus probation made the sentence illegal	State: The cap plainly modified only executed incarceration; suspended time may be imposed in addition; Ray was informed of a higher statutory maximum	The phrase is clear and unambiguous: the cap limits executed incarceration to 4 years; suspended time is not prohibited.
If the phrase were ambiguous, whether a reasonable lay person would have understood suspended time could be imposed in addition	Ray: The record did not explain “executed,” so a reasonable lay person would not expect suspended time beyond 4 years	State: Ray knew his maximum exposure (10.5 years) and the record supported an understanding that additional suspended time could be imposed	Even assuming ambiguity, the plea record (including the advice form showing max 10.5 years) shows a reasonable person would have understood an additional suspended portion could be imposed.

Cuffley v. State, 7 A.3d 557 (Md. 2010) (ambiguity in plea terms must be evaluated by what a reasonable lay person would have understood)
Baines v. State, 7 A.3d 578 (Md. 2010) (court may not impose a split sentence exceeding an agreed cap absent an explicated allowance)
Matthews v. State, 36 A.3d 499 (Md. 2012) (ambiguities in plea/hearing record are resolved in defendant’s favor)
Dotson v. State, 583 A.2d 710 (Md. 1991) (once judge accepts plea agreement, agreed punishment is binding and must be embodied in judgment)
United States v. Jordan, 509 F.3d 191 (4th Cir. 2007) (interpretation of plea-agreement language and ambiguity is a question of law)