Ray v. Ropes & Gray LLP
961 F. Supp. 2d 344
D. Mass.2013Background
- John H. Ray III, a black attorney, worked as an associate in Ropes & Gray’s Boston general litigation group (joined 2005); the firm follows an "up-or-out" promotion system toward partnership.
- Ray’s performance reviews were strong in 2006 but grew increasingly critical in 2007–2008; Policy Committee denied advancement in December 2008 and Ropes offered severance and a limited office/use period.
- Ray requested extensions of severance and later sought recommendation letters; after he threatened an EEOC complaint (and filed one), Ropes told him not to return to the office and later declined to provide recommendations.
- EEOC initially issued a "no reasonable cause" determination, then on reconsideration found probable cause of retaliation; Ray publicized the EEOC decision and Ropes provided the EEOC’s initial letter to the legal website Above the Law.
- Ray sued alleging breach of contract and covenant, race discrimination (Title VII, §1981, Mass. ch.151B), retaliation (Title VII, §1981, ch.151B), MERA and Mass. ch.93A claims, and defamation; cross-motions for summary judgment were filed. The court narrowed the case to retaliation claims for trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Breach of contract / covenant of good faith | Handbook language and firm promises created an implied contract / covenant protecting against termination or unfair treatment | Handbook disclaimed contractual rights; firm retained unilateral modification right; no contractual term specified | Ropes entitled to summary judgment — no enforceable contract, so no covenant claim |
| Title VII / §1981 / Mass. ch.151B discrimination (failure to promote) | Denial of partnership was racially motivated; partner comments and firm promotion statistics show bias | Denial was based on contemporaneous negative partner evaluations and legitimate business judgment | Ropes entitled to summary judgment — plaintiff met prima facie but failed to show pretext or discriminatory animus |
| Retaliation (failure to provide recommendations; dissemination of EEOC letter) | Filing EEOC charge and protesting were protected; withholding letters and releasing EEOC materials were adverse and retaliatory | Letters withheld for good-faith reasons; EEOC letter not confidential and firm responded to media inquiry to correct the record | Summary judgment denied for both sides — disputed facts (causation, pretext, and motive) require jury trial on these retaliation claims |
| MERA / Mass. ch.93A / Defamation | MERA and ch.93A claims and HR disclosure harmed career and reputation; Curtis defamed by publishing reprimand | MERA preempted by ch.151B; ch.93A not available in employer-employee context and lacks proximate causation; HR communications protected by conditional privilege | MERA and ch.93A claims dismissed; summary judgment for Curtis on defamation (privileged HR communications) |
Key Cases Cited
- Nat'l Amusements, Inc. v. Town of Dedham, 43 F.3d 731 (1st Cir. 1995) (summary judgment standard; genuine dispute and material fact definitions)
- O'Brien v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., 422 Mass. 686 (Mass. 1996) (employee manual may create contract only when reasonably viewed as binding)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (U.S. 1973) (burden-shifting framework for discrimination claims)
- Mesnick v. Gen. Elec. Co., 950 F.2d 816 (1st Cir. 1991) (employer's perception of decision-maker is central to pretext inquiry)
- Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. v. White, 548 U.S. 53 (U.S. 2006) (retaliation standard — protection against employer actions that would deter reasonable worker)
- Anthony's Pier Four, Inc. v. HBC Assocs., 411 Mass. 451 (Mass. 1991) (implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing principle)
- Foley v. Polaroid Corp., 400 Mass. 82 (Mass. 1987) (conditional privilege for employer communications about employee performance)