RAY v. CAIN
2:13-cv-01483
W.D. Pa.Sep 29, 2016Background
- In the early morning of Oct. 16, 2011, Officers Markley and Cain found Jerry Ray lying in a busy intersection in Washington, PA; they activated cruiser lights and approached him.
- Officers claim Ray appeared intoxicated, staggered across lanes, and at the northeast corner struck a traffic-light pole and fell into the northbound lane.
- Markley and Cain handcuffed and arrested Ray for public intoxication while he lay in the roadway; a cellphone was recovered incident to arrest.
- While handcuffed in the roadway (for roughly 2½ minutes), Ray was struck by a northbound vehicle driven by an intoxicated motorist (Risbin), sustaining severe injuries.
- Expert reports: plaintiff’s toxicologist opined Ray’s BAC was lower than officers’ described outward signs of intoxication; police-practices expert offered mixed admissible and inadmissible opinions.
- Procedural posture: defendants moved for summary judgment on §1983 Fourth Amendment (excessive force), Fourteenth Amendment (state-created danger / special-relationship), state-law battery, and Monell failure-to-train claims; court denied summary judgment on excessive-force (Counts II & V) and granted summary judgment on all other counts (Counts I, III, IV, VI, VII).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Excessive force (handcuffing in roadway) | Handcuffing and detaining Ray in middle of intersection was objectively unreasonable and caused injury | Handcuffs were reasonable given intoxication, noncompliance, safety concerns; officers entitled to qualified immunity | Denied summary judgment as to excessive-force claims — genuine fact issues (e.g., level of intoxication) preclude resolution and preclude qualified immunity determination at this stage |
| Substantive due process — state-created danger | Officers affirmatively created/increased danger (lights/cruiser position, directing Ray, handcuffing in lane) and acted with conscience-shocking culpability | Officers acted to protect Ray and themselves, took steps (strobe flashlight, 911 calls, repositioning cruiser); at worst negligence, not conscience-shocking conduct | Granted summary judgment on state-created danger claims — although affirmative acts occurred, plaintiff failed to show the required conscience-shocking culpability or that risk was knowingly disregarded |
| Municipal liability (failure to train) | City’s training/supervision and informal customs permitted deficient policing; single-incident failure obvious | Officers were MPOETC-compliant; no pattern of similar violations and no showing that training deficiency caused injury | Granted summary judgment on Monell claim — plaintiff failed to show deliberate indifference or pattern; single-incident theory not established |
| State-law battery (PSTCA immunity) | Officers’ conduct amounted to willful misconduct removing immunity | Defendants protected by PSTCA immunity; at most negligence, not willful misconduct | Granted summary judgment on battery claims — plaintiff did not show willful misconduct as defined by Pennsylvania law |
Key Cases Cited
- Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989) (Fourth Amendment excessive-force analysis uses objective-reasonableness test)
- Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194 (2001) (qualified immunity two-step framework)
- Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982) (qualified immunity standard: clearly established law)
- City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989) (failure-to-train municipal liability standard)
- Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978) (municipal liability requires policy or custom causing constitutional violation)
- Connick v. Thompson, 563 U.S. 51 (2011) (pattern ordinarily necessary to show deliberate indifference for failure-to-train)
- DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social Servs., 489 U.S. 189 (1989) (no affirmative due-process duty to protect from private actors absent special circumstances)
- Rivas v. City of Passaic, 365 F.3d 181 (3d Cir. 2004) (reasonableness assessed from perspective of reasonable officer on scene)
- Vargas v. City of Philadelphia, 783 F.3d 962 (3d Cir. 2015) (levels of culpability for conscience-shocking conduct)