Ray Cromartie v. Bradfield Shealy, Randa Wharton, 941 F.3d 1244

In April 1994 Cromartie participated in an armed robbery during which he shot and killed convenience-store clerk Richard Slysz; forensic ties included a .25 caliber gun matched to bullets, a beer carton with Cromartie’s thumbprint, shoeprint evidence, canine tracking, and accomplice/witness testimony.
Cromartie was convicted in 1997 of malice murder and related counts and sentenced to death; state and U.S. Supreme Court direct appeals were denied.
State habeas relief was denied (order issued 2012); federal habeas was denied by the Middle District of Georgia in 2017 and appellate review was denied through certiorari in 2018.
In December 2018 Cromartie moved in state court for a new trial and postconviction DNA testing under Ga. Code §5-5-41(c), alleging modern touch-DNA and probabilistic-genotyping could implicate an accomplice; the trial court denied the motion (Sept. 16, 2019) and the Georgia Supreme Court refused discretionary review (Oct. 25, 2019).
On Oct. 22, 2019 Cromartie filed a 42 U.S.C. §1983 facial challenge to Georgia’s postconviction DNA-testing statute (claiming Fourteenth Amendment due process and access-to-courts violations) and moved to stay his execution; the district court dismissed the complaint and denied a stay (Oct. 29, 2019).
The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the dismissal for failure to state a claim and affirmed the denial of a stay; the circuit denied as moot Cromartie’s emergency stay motion.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Facial due-process challenge to Ga. §5-5-41(c)	Cromartie: statute’s diligence and "reasonable probability" materiality requirements are fundamentally unfair and bar meaningful postconviction DNA relief	Georgia: statute substantially mirrors procedures approved or endorsed in Osborne and federal law and therefore satisfies due process	Statute constitutional; complaint fails to state a due-process claim under Osborne; dismissal affirmed
As-applied due-process challenge	Cromartie: Georgia courts misapplied §5-5-41(c) in his case (denying testing)	Georgia: claim was disavowed/waived and, in any event, is barred by Rooker–Feldman and is merely an alleged state-law misapplication	Waived and/or barred; dismissal affirmed
Access-to-courts (First/14th) claim	Cromartie: denial of DNA testing obstructs his access to judicial relief (new trial or clemency)	Georgia: plaintiff lacks "actual injury" required for access claim; clemency is not a constitutional right; procedural-due-process ruling disposes of access argument	Claim abandoned on appeal and fails on merits for lack of actual injury; dismissal affirmed
Stay of execution pending appeal	Cromartie: execution should be stayed to permit consideration of §1983 claims and testing	Georgia: district court properly denied stay; emergency stay unnecessary once underlying claims fail	Denial of stay affirmed; emergency stay denied as moot

District Attorney’s Office for the Third Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52 (2009) (sets the due-process standard for postconviction DNA-access claims and approves limits like materiality, diligence, and new-availability)
Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521 (2011) (Osborne limits federal remedies for state postconviction DNA procedures)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s duty to disclose material exculpatory evidence)
Kyles v. Whitley, 514 U.S. 419 (1995) (materiality/"reasonable probability" standard for withheld evidence)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) ("reasonable probability" prejudice standard for ineffective assistance claims)
Cunningham v. Dist. Attorney’s Office, 592 F.3d 1237 (11th Cir. 2010) (applying Osborne and upholding Alabama’s postconviction procedures)
Alvarez v. Attorney General, 679 F.3d 1257 (11th Cir. 2012) (applying Osborne and upholding Florida’s postconviction DNA procedures)