Ray Clifton v. Ruby McCammack, 43 N.E.3d 213

Darryl Clifton died after being struck by Ruby McCammack’s car; emergency responders attempted resuscitation and pronounced him dead at 11:43 a.m.
Ray Clifton (father) watched a noon news report about a fatal moped accident on a route his son frequently used, became worried, drove ~6–7 minutes to the scene, and arrived about 25–40 minutes after the collision.
At the scene Clifton saw police, bystanders, Darryl’s moped, and a body covered by a white sheet; he recognized his son’s shoes but never approached the body or saw blood or resuscitation efforts.
Police later confirmed to Clifton at a nearby restaurant that the victim was his son; Clifton experienced significant emotional distress, sought counseling, and sued McCammack for negligent infliction of emotional distress.
McCammack admitted negligence causing Darryl’s death and moved for summary judgment; the trial court granted summary judgment for McCammack, the Court of Appeals reversed, and the Indiana Supreme Court granted transfer.
The Supreme Court considered whether Clifton met the bystander-rule temporal and circumstantial legal requirements for recovery as explained in Groves and Smith.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Clifton satisfied the temporal component (arrived "soon after")	Clifton: arrived within minutes of death and therefore meets the temporal requirement	McCammack: timing alone insufficient because other circumstances changed the scene before arrival	Court: timing insufficient — temporal prong not met in light of material changes to scene and victim before arrival (legal determination)
Whether Clifton satisfied Smith’s three circumstantial factors (scene essentially same; victim in same condition; claimant not informed before arrival)	Clifton: scene and victim were essentially as at incident and he did not know victim identity before arriving	McCammack: scene and victim were materially altered (body moved/covered); Clifton knew of the accident from news (indirectly informed)	Court: Clifton failed all three circumstantial factors as a matter of law; no bystander recovery; summary judgment for McCammack affirmed

Smith v. Toney, 862 N.E.2d 656 (Ind. 2007) (clarifies bystander test: one temporal and three circumstantial factors; those factors are questions of law)
Groves v. Taylor, 729 N.E.2d 569 (Ind. 2000) (adopts bystander rule permitting recovery when plaintiff witnesses or arrives soon after and has close familial relationship)
Shuamber v. Henderson, 579 N.E.2d 452 (Ind. 1991) (describes Indiana’s prior impact/modified-impact approaches to emotional distress recovery)
Bowen v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 517 N.W.2d 432 (Wis. 1994) (persuasive authority outlining factors to limit spurious bystander claims)
Thing v. La Chusa, 771 P.2d 814 (Cal. 1989) (discusses limits on bystander recovery and foreseeability concerns)