Ravinder Kaur v. Merrick Garland
2f4th823
9th Cir.2021Background
- Ravinder Kaur entered the U.S. in 2001 after an arranged marriage to Balwinder Singh; she alleges long‑term severe domestic abuse (physical, sexual, threats) by Singh and in‑laws.
- Singh was deported in 2007 and later told Kaur he would "take revenge" if she returned to India; Singh died in India in 2013 and his parents thereafter threatened to kill Kaur and blamed her for his death.
- Kaur applied for asylum in 2001–02; an IJ denied relief in 2002 for lack of credibility and because the application contained a fabricated rape claim. Multiple motions to reopen were denied over the years.
- In 2018 Kaur moved to reopen based on changed country conditions: increased violence against women (including widows and dowry deaths) in India, plus Singh’s death and her in‑laws’ threats; she also asserted prima facie eligibility for asylum, withholding, and CAT protection.
- The BIA denied the 2018 motion, finding no material changed country conditions, no prima facie eligibility for asylum/withholding/CAT, and that Kaur could reasonably relocate in India.
- The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and remanded: it held the BIA erred in its changed‑country‑conditions, particular‑social‑group, CAT, and burden/relocation analyses and remanded for further proceedings.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Singh’s death and in‑laws’ threats + country evidence constitute "changed country conditions" allowing untimely motion to reopen | Kaur: husband’s death and threats are changes in India (outside her control) and material given increased violence against women/widows | BIA: changes are personal (not changed country conditions) and insufficient to excuse the filing deadline | Court: BIA erred — death/threats occurred in India and, combined with documented increase in violence against women/widows, constitute material changed country conditions; remand |
| Whether Kaur established a prima facie case for asylum/withholding based on membership in a particular social group (husband’s family / widow status) | Kaur: persecuted because of kinship/family membership and widowhood; family perceives her as disloyal so family membership is a central reason for harm | BIA: facts show a personal vendetta; no evidence others in the group were targeted; PSG not established | Court: BIA erred — persecutor can target a member of the same PSG; familial status/widowhood can be cognizable; remand for full PSG and past‑persecution/relocation analysis |
| Whether Kaur showed prima facie entitlement to CAT protection and whether BIA applied correct standard | Kaur: evidence of past abuse, threats, police corruption, and impunity makes state consent/acquiescence plausible; reasonable likelihood standard met at motion to reopen stage | BIA: required "more likely than not" and found Kaur’s fears speculative as to state acquiescence | Court: BIA applied wrong standard (motion to reopen requires reasonable likelihood, not more‑likely‑than‑not) and abused discretion on consent/acquiescence; remand |
| Burden regarding internal relocation | Kaur: if past persecution shown, burden shifts to government to prove reasonable internal relocation | BIA: placed burden on Kaur to show she could not relocate | Held: BIA erred in allocation of burden if past persecution is established; remand for relocation analysis consistent with PSG/past‑persecution findings |
Key Cases Cited
- Najmabadi v. Holder, 597 F.3d 983 (9th Cir. 2010) (discusses limits of personal‑change rule for motions to reopen)
- He v. Gonzales, 501 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2007) (explains that self‑induced personal changes generally do not satisfy changed‑country‑conditions exception)
- Chandra v. Holder, 751 F.3d 1034 (9th Cir. 2014) (personal changes can make country changes material for reopening)
- Rodriguez v. Garland, 990 F.3d 1205 (9th Cir. 2021) (applies Chandra and limits motions relying solely on personal changes)
- Salim v. Lynch, 831 F.3d 1133 (9th Cir. 2016) (explains prima facie standard and changed‑conditions relevance)
- Ordonez v. INS, 345 F.3d 777 (9th Cir. 2003) (defines "reasonable likelihood" standard for prima facie showing at motion to reopen)
- Maini v. I.N.S., 212 F.3d 1167 (9th Cir. 2000) (persecutor’s motive, not demographics, controls PSG analysis where persecutor and victim share group)
- Barajas‑Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351 (9th Cir. 2017) (explains differing standards for asylum vs withholding and evidentiary requirements)
- Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010) (recognizes the importance of motions to reopen as procedural safeguard)
- Nuru v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 1207 (9th Cir. 2005) (addresses substantive standards for CAT adjudications)