Raven Fox v. Dakkota Integrated Systems
980 F.3d 1146
7th Cir.2020Background
- Raven Fox worked for Dakkota (2012–2019) and was required to clock in/out by scanning her hand on a biometric timekeeping device.
- Fox alleges Dakkota (1) failed to obtain written informed consent, (2) disclosed biometric data to a third-party administrator, and (3) failed to develop, publish, and comply with BIPA §15(a) retention and destruction policies, resulting in retention of her handprint after employment ended.
- Fox filed a putative class action in Illinois state court asserting violations of BIPA §§15(a), 15(b), and 15(d).
- Dakkota removed under CAFA and argued LMRA preemption because Fox was a union-represented employee; the district court dismissed the §15(b) and §15(d) claims as preempted and remanded the §15(a) claim to state court based on Bryant.
- The Seventh Circuit reversed the remand: it held Fox adequately alleged a concrete, particularized injury from unlawful retention/sharing under §15(a) and reinstated federal jurisdiction, remanding to the district court to decide preemption in the first instance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Fox has Article III standing to sue under BIPA §15(a) (retention/destruction duties) | Fox: unlawful retention and sharing of her immutable biometric (handprint) after employment ended is a concrete, particularized privacy injury | Dakkota: Bryant bars §15(a) standing for a claim premised on failure to disclose policy; remand appropriate | Held: Fox has standing—unlawful retention/sharing is a concrete, particularized injury under §15(a) |
| Whether a §15(a) claim that alleges only failure to publicly disclose policies is sufficient for standing | Fox: §15(a) protects privacy by conditioning retention on purpose; disclosure-only violation can be part of a concrete injury when tied to retention/sharing | Dakkota: Bryant precludes standing for disclosure-only §15(a) claims in federal court | Held: Distinguishes Bryant — disclosure-only claims may lack standing, but Fox alleged full §15(a) duties and wrongful retention/sharing, which suffices |
| Whether union representation gives an independent basis for Article III standing (collective-bargaining context) | Fox: As a union-represented employee, Miller supports standing because biometric practices affect terms/conditions of employment and collective bargaining | Dakkota: Preemption and lack of individualized injury argue against federal standing | Held: Miller applies — union-represented status supplies a concrete injury dimension tied to collective-bargaining interests, supporting standing |
| Whether the LMRA/collective-bargaining preemption question should be resolved on appeal | Fox: Not addressed on appeal here | Dakkota: LMRA preemption argued below; district court dismissed some claims | Held: Seventh Circuit declined to decide preemption; remanded to district court to address preemption in first instance |
Key Cases Cited
- Bryant v. Compass Group USA, Inc., 958 F.3d 617 (7th Cir. 2020) (held standing for §15(b) informed-consent claim but no standing for a narrow §15(a) public-disclosure-only claim)
- Miller v. Southwest Airlines Co., 926 F.3d 898 (7th Cir. 2019) (unionized employees had standing where biometric practices implicated collective bargaining; claims preempted by Railway Labor Act)
- Patel v. Facebook, Inc., 932 F.3d 1264 (9th Cir. 2019) (BIPA violations create a concrete privacy injury analogous to common-law privacy torts; standing for §15(a)/(b) claims)
- Gubala v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 846 F.3d 909 (7th Cir. 2017) (former customer lacked standing where statutory data-retention violation posed no plausible risk of harm or misuse)
- Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016) (Article III requires a concrete and particularized injury even for statutory violations)