Raulerson v. Wright
2011 Fla. App. LEXIS 5420
| Fla. Dist. Ct. App. | 2011Background
- The Father appeals a trial court order granting the Mother temporary permission to relocate with the child and denying his request for an injunction.
- The relocation occurred before a final hearing, and the court affirmed injunctive denial but reversed on the relocation permission.
- The Mother moved from Perry to Ponte Vedra without a sworn petition or court approval, delivering an unsworn Notice of Intent to Relocate to the Father one day before relocation.
- The hearing focused on injunctive relief rather than all best-interest factors for relocation, and the court found substantial compliance with §61.13001(3) and a likelihood of final approval.
- Section 61.13001 requires a sworn petition filed with the court for relocation unless there is a written agreement; authorization for a temporary order depends on proper filing and likelihood of final approval.
- The First District Court of Appeal reversed the temporary relocation grant, holding the Mother did not comply with the sworn-petition requirement and thus could not receive temporary permission.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the temporary relocation was proper under §61.13001(6)(b). | Raulerson contends no temporary relocation without a sworn petition. | Wright argues substantial compliance suffices in practice. | Temporary relocation not proper; reversed. |
| Whether hand-delivery of an unsworn notice satisfies §61.13001(3). | Mother claims notice supports relocation necessity. | Father argues sworn petition required; no compliance. | Unsanctioned; not a valid petition. |
| Whether trial court erred by treating substantial compliance as meeting the statute. | Mother relied on substantial compliance to grant relief. | Father argues statutory language requires actual compliance. | Error; statutorily mandated petition required. |
| What is the appropriate standard of review for relocation decisions under §61.13001? | Not necessary to recite standard beyond abuse of discretion. | Abuse-of-discretion standard applies, with de novo review for statutory interpretation. | Standard affirmed for abuse of discretion; statutory interpretation de novo. |
Key Cases Cited
- Norris v. Heckerman, 972 So.2d 1098 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008) (relocation decisions reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Manyari v. Manyan, 958 So.2d 512 (Fla. 3d DCA 2007) (affirming deference to trial court in relocation cases)
- Edrington v. Edrington, 945 So.2d 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 2006) (relocation factors and best interests)
- Landingham v. Landingham, 685 So.2d 946 (Fla. 1st DCA 1996) (relevant to relocation and custody timing)
- Hall v. Maal, 32 So.3d 682 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (substantial compliance requires some compliance)
- Conners v. Mullins, 27 So.3d 199 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010) (enumerated §61.13001(7) factors; relocation best interests)
- B.Y. v. Dep’t of Children & Families, 887 So.2d 1253 (Fla.2004) (statutory framework for petitioning relocation)
- Mendenhall v. State, 48 So.3d 740 (Fla.2010) (statutory interpretation guidance)
- Heart of Adoptions, Inc. v. J.A., 963 So.2d 189 (Fla.2007) (textual interpretation governs statutory construction)
- Advantage Digital Sys., Inc. v. Digital Imaging Servs., Inc., 870 So.2d 111 (Fla. 2d DCA 2003) (injunction cannot prevent completed acts)
- City of Jacksonville v. Naegele Outdoor Adver. Co., 634 So.2d 750 (Fla. 1st DCA 1994) (injunctions restrain future injuries)