Raul Trevino Lara Jr. v. State, 13-14-00123-CR

Raul Lara was convicted of murder by a Hidalgo County jury and sentenced to 55 years; he appealed challenging (1) the trial court’s decision to submit to the jury whether two witnesses (Julissa and Lucinda Tijerina) were accomplices and (2) the admission of two written custodial statements.
Two recorded custodial interviews of Lara were conducted; Lara executed written waivers and gave two written summaries: the first denied knowledge, the second admitted being in the van but blamed another occupant for shooting. The trial court held suppression hearings and found both statements voluntary and admissible.
Julissa and Lucinda Tijerina (juveniles at the time) were detained and later given immunity in exchange for testimony; neither was ever charged by indictment for the murder and both gave statements before immunity was discussed.
Multiple independent eyewitnesses (several non-family witnesses) identified Lara as one of the shooters; physical evidence (bullet strikes, cartridge casings, and fingerprints in the van) and other witness testimony corroborated connection to the van and Lara.
The trial court instructed the jury on accomplice testimony but left it to the jury to decide whether Julissa and/or Lucinda were accomplices rather than declaring them accomplices as a matter of law; defense made no objection to the final charge.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Lara)	Held
Whether trial court erred by leaving to jury the question whether Julissa & Lucinda were accomplices instead of declaring them accomplices as a matter of law	Immunity does not automatically make a witness an accomplice; no charging instrument existed and no evidence of an affirmative act by them in furtherance of the murder; jury determination proper	Because both witnesses received transactional immunity and were involved, the court should have declared them accomplices as a matter of law and required corroboration	Court upheld trial court’s approach: leaving the issue to the jury was correct; no reversible error shown and, in any event, corroborating independent evidence was strong
Admissibility of Lara’s two written custodial statements: voluntariness and compliance with Art. 38.22	Statements were made after Miranda warnings and knowing, intelligent, voluntary waivers; recordings and testimony support voluntariness; redacted statements and rulings satisfied statutory requirements	Waivers were invalid/coerced (questioning techniques, literacy concerns, pressure to initial forms), and statements therefore inadmissible	Trial court’s factual findings that statements were voluntary were supported by the record; even if error, admission was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because independent ID and other evidence strongly incriminated Lara

Alvarado v. State, 912 S.W.2d 199 (Tex. Crim. App. 1995) (standards for voluntariness hearings and burden on State to prove voluntariness)
Druery v. State, 225 S.W.3d 491 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (when a witness is an accomplice as a matter of law vs. question for the jury)
Herron v. State, 86 S.W.3d 621 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) (trial court duty to properly instruct on accomplice testimony when witness is an accomplice as a matter of law)
Moulton v. State, 508 S.W.2d 833 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (transactional immunity does not automatically make a witness an accomplice as a matter of law)
Smith v. State, 332 S.W.3d 425 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (requirement of affirmative act evidence before labeling witness an accomplice)
Kunkle v. State, 771 S.W.2d 435 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986) (accomplice status requires evidence of an affirmative act in furtherance of the offense)
Castillo v. State, 221 S.W.3d 689 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (standard for excluding accomplice testimony and corroboration analysis)
Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (consideration of the inculpatory value of a confession when assessing harm)