Raul Cortez v. Lorie Davis, Director
683 F. App'x 292
| 5th Cir. | 2017Background
- Raul Cortez was convicted in Texas of capital murder for a quadruple homicide and sentenced to death; he was represented by three trial attorneys.
- At trial, the State elicited testimony that two earlier confessing suspects (James Jones and Daniel Guajardo) took polygraph exams and were later excluded, and that the State’s key witness (Eddie Williams) took a polygraph and was treated as more likely involved.
- Cortez’s trial counsel did not object to those polygraph references; on cross-examination counsel elicited that polygraph results are generally inadmissible.
- Cortez raised ineffective-assistance claims in state habeas proceedings alleging counsel should have objected (and moved in limine) to polygraph evidence; the state habeas court found counsel’s non‑objection was reasonable trial strategy and denied relief; the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals adopted those findings.
- Cortez sought federal habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254; the district court denied relief; this panel affirmed, reviewing for AEDPA deference and applying Strickland’s deficient-performance and prejudice standards.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether counsel was deficient for not objecting to polygraph references | Cortez: failure to object (or move in limine) to inadmissible polygraph evidence fell below objective reasonableness | State: counsel consciously chose not to object as part of a strategy to gain jury credibility for Cortez and portray the police investigation as inept | Held: Not deficient — state court reasonably found non‑objection was a legitimate trial strategy |
| Whether counsel’s alleged deficiency prejudiced the outcome | Cortez: polygraph references were the linchpin that sustained Williams’s credibility and allowed exclusion of other confessors, so result would likely differ without them | State: even without polygraph testimony, Jones and Guajardo were not credible and Williams’s testimony was independently corroborated by physical evidence | Held: No prejudice — state court’s factual findings (credibility, corroboration) were reasonable and entitled to deference |
| Whether state court unreasonably applied clearly established federal law under AEDPA | Cortez: state court misapplied Strickland and related Supreme Court standards | State: state court applied Strickland reasonably and AEDPA requires deference to its strategic and factual determinations | Held: State court’s application of Strickland and factual findings were not unreasonable under AEDPA |
| Whether failure to file a motion in limine independently constituted ineffective assistance | Cortez: counsel should have sought pretrial exclusion of polygraph references | State: motion in limine was not feasible because testimony was not reasonably anticipated; counsel’s choice was consistent with strategy | Held: No independent claim — failure to file motion did not establish deficient performance |
Key Cases Cited
- Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (benchmark for ineffective assistance: deficient performance and prejudice)
- Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86 (2011) (AEDPA deference to state-court decisions applying Strickland)
- Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (highly deferential AEDPA standard; burden on petitioner)
- Schriro v. Landrigan, 550 U.S. 465 (2007) (federal court must ask whether state-court determination was unreasonable)
- Pondexter v. Quarterman, 537 F.3d 511 (5th Cir. 2008) (standard for reviewing Strickland claims on habeas in Fifth Circuit)
- Lyons v. McCotter, 770 F.2d 529 (5th Cir. 1985) (discussing limits of hindsight review of strategic trial decisions)
- Charles v. Thaler, 629 F.3d 494 (5th Cir. 2011) (addressing feasibility of pretrial motions to exclude unforeseen testimony)
- Dodson v. Stephens, [citation="611 F. App'x 168"] (5th Cir. 2015) (persuasive authority rejecting ineffective-assistance claim over failure to object to polygraph testimony)
- Blue v. Thaler, 665 F.3d 647 (5th Cir. 2011) (discussing §2254(e)(1) presumption of correctness for state court factual findings)
- Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111 (2009) (clarifying Strickland/AEDPA interplay)