Ratliff v. State, 881 N.W.2d 233

Nathan Ratliff was convicted by a jury of robbery, burglary, aggravated assault, theft, and felonious restraint; this Court affirmed the convictions on direct appeal.
Ratliff filed a post-conviction relief application alleging ineffective assistance of trial counsel and improper sentencing as an habitual offender.
At the PCR hearing, trial counsel testified he advised Ratliff not to testify but said Ratliff could if he insisted; counsel also testified he did not file a speedy-trial demand because the court would have found good cause for delay.
The district court found conflicting testimony about whether Ratliff wanted to testify, found no prejudice from counsel’s choices, and found no speedy-trial violation.
The district court took judicial notice of a 2003 probation-revocation order, treated Ratliff’s 2003 conviction as a felony for habitual-offender purposes, and denied relief.
The Supreme Court affirmed, rejecting Ratliff’s claims that counsel was ineffective and that he was improperly sentenced as an habitual offender.

Issue	Ratliff's Argument	State's Argument	Held
Trial counsel refused to let Ratliff testify	Ratliff says he told counsel he wanted to testify but counsel prevented it	Counsel says he advised against testifying but informed Ratliff of the right; no affirmative assertion by Ratliff	No violation; district court not clearly erroneous — Ratliff did not affirmatively assert right and showed no prejudice
Counsel failed to demand a speedy trial	Ratliff says lack of a formal demand led to ~13-month delay that prejudiced his defense	State says delay was due to multiple defendants, schedules, witnesses; defendant sought one continuance; counsel reasonably expected good-cause findings	No speedy-trial deprivation and no prejudice shown; ineffective-assistance claim fails
Prior 2003 sentence counts as felony for habitual-offender statute	Ratliff says original sentence was ≤1 year so it should be a misdemeanor and revocation order was not proper evidence	State says revocation converted the conviction to felony and the court properly took judicial notice of the revocation order	Court may judicially notice the signed revocation order; the 2003 conviction counts as a felony for habitual-offender sentencing

Syvertson v. State, 699 N.W.2d 855 (N.D. 2005) (standard for review of factual findings in post-conviction proceedings)
Greywind v. State, 689 N.W.2d 390 (N.D. 2004) (post-conviction findings review principles)
Sambursky v. State, 751 N.W.2d 247 (N.D. 2008) (ineffective assistance is mixed question of law and fact)
Chisholm v. State, 871 N.W.2d 595 (N.D. 2015) (two-prong Strickland framework in North Dakota)
Roth v. State, 735 N.W.2d 882 (N.D. 2007) (ineffective assistance standards)
Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44 (U.S. 1987) (defendant's constitutional right to testify)
Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (U.S. 1983) (defendant's personal right to testify)
State v. Antoine, 564 N.W.2d 637 (N.D. 1997) (waiver and courts presuming attorney-client decision on testifying)
Grand Forks v. Gale, 876 N.W.2d 701 (N.D. 2016) (speedy trial balancing test and review standards)
Moran, 711 N.W.2d 915 (N.D. 2006) (review standards for speedy trial determinations)
State v. Buchholz, 692 N.W.2d 105 (N.D. 2005) (person initially convicted of felony even if later reduced under former statute)
State v. Carpenter, 793 N.W.2d 765 (N.D. 2011) (habitual offender statutory framework)
State v. Cummings, 386 N.W.2d 468 (N.D. 1986) (wide latitude for sentencing judges to consider information)