Rash v. Town of Mammoth
233 Ariz. 577
| Ariz. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Samuel Rash was terminated from the Town of Mammoth police force on March 22, 2011; the Town requested review and the Pinal County Employee Merit System Commission upheld the termination after a November 29, 2011 hearing.
- Rash received the Commission’s written decision on March 31, 2012 and filed a statutory special action in superior court under A.R.S. § 38-1004 on May 25, 2012 challenging the Commission’s decision.
- The Town and the Commission moved to dismiss as untimely and for failure to join an indispensable party; the superior court applied Rule 7(i) (Special Appellate Court Provisions) and Rule 9(a), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., holding the 30-day appellate time limit applied and also found laches barred the action.
- Rash appealed; the court of appeals considered whether appellate procedural time limits or the Administrative Review Act applied to statutory special actions under § 38-1004 and whether laches barred the petition.
- The court concluded Rule 7(i) and Rule 9(a) do not apply to statutory special actions filed in superior court, the Administrative Review Act’s 35-day limit did not apply, and laches could bar only if unreasonable delay and prejudice were shown — which the superior court had not supported with evidence.
- The court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings (including development of any laches defense evidence).
Issues
| Issue | Rash's Argument | Town/Commission's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Rule 7(i) (Special Appellate Court Provisions) and Rule 9(a) appellate time limits apply to statutory special actions filed in superior court | Rule 7(i)/Rule 9(a) do not apply; Rule 1(b) limits which special action rules apply to statutory special actions | Rule 7(i)/Rule 9(a) apply, so the 30-day appellate deadline barred the petition | Court: Rule 7(i)/Rule 9(a) do not apply to statutory special actions in superior court; dismissal as untimely under those rules was error |
| Whether the Administrative Review Act’s 35-day deadline (A.R.S. § 12-904(A)) governs appeals under § 38-1004 | § 12-904 does not apply; § 38-1004 provides its own judicial-review procedure and political subdivisions are excepted from the ARA | ARA applies and its deadline bars the petition | Court: ARA does not apply to § 38-1004 appeals; 12-904(A) deadline not applicable |
| Whether, absent a statutory deadline, a “normal appeal period” or precedent bars the petition | No fixed “normal” period applies; only laches can bar the remedy | Courts have applied a de facto normal period or earlier cases require prompt filing | Court: No automatic “normal” appeal period applies; any timeliness bar must proceed under laches doctrine |
| Whether laches barred Rash’s petition given ~6-month delay from when he became aware of the decision | Laches does not bar the petition absent proof of unreasonable delay and prejudice; Commission’s written decision was not received until March 31, 2012 | Delay and policy favoring finality justify laches here | Court: Superior court abused its discretion; record lacked findings or evidence that delay was unreasonable or that defendants suffered prejudice; remand for further proceedings if laches pursued |
Key Cases Cited
- Old Republic Nat’l Title Ins. Co. v. New Falls Corp., 224 Ariz. 526 (procedural dismissal reviewed for abuse of discretion)
- Villa de Jardines Ass’n v. Flagstar Bank, FSB, 227 Ariz. 91 (statutory interpretation; plain-meaning approach)
- Justice v. City of Casa Grande, 116 Ariz. 66 (Administrative Review Act does not govern § 38-1004 special actions)
- Felix v. Superior Court, 92 Ariz. 247 (discussing laches in context of certiorari; noted footnote about normal appeal period not adopted)
- State v. Mahoney, 25 Ariz. App. 217 (special action dismissed on laches grounds in criminal-prosecution context)
- State ex rel. Neely v. Rodriguez, 165 Ariz. 74 (where an appeal right was ignored, equitable time bar considerations apply; laches discussion)
- Harris v. Purcell, 193 Ariz. 409 (factors for evaluating whether delay is unreasonable)
- League of Ariz. Cities & Towns v. Martin, 219 Ariz. 556 (prejudice standard for laches: injury or change of position required)
