Raoger Corporation v. Barrie Myers
711 S.W.3d 206
Tex.2025Background
- Barrie Myers was seriously injured in a car accident after being rear-ended by Nasar Khan shortly after midnight, following Khan's visit to Cadot Restaurant in Dallas where he consumed alcohol.
- Khan’s blood alcohol content (BAC) was measured at 0.139 at 3:06 a.m., above the legal limit; however, witnesses (including Khan, his companion, the bartender, and law enforcement) mostly testified that he did not appear intoxicated when served or at the scene.
- Myers sued Cadot Restaurant under the Texas Dram Shop Act, alleging Cadot served alcohol to Khan when he was obviously intoxicated and a danger to himself and others.
- Trial court granted summary judgment to Cadot, finding Myers presented no evidence it was apparent to the provider that Khan was obviously intoxicated; the court of appeals reversed, finding a fact issue.
- Supreme Court of Texas reviewed whether circumstantial evidence from BAC and expert opinions sufficed to establish that intoxication was apparent to the provider at the time of service, and also addressed the trial court’s denial of Myers's motion for continuance.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Dram Shop Act: Apparent Obvious Intoxication | Cadot should have noticed Khan was obviously intoxicated when served, based on BAC | No evidence Khan’s intoxication was apparent to provider at service | No competent evidence; summary judgment for Cadot |
| Use of Circumstantial Evidence | BAC and expert opinion can show Khan must have appeared intoxicated at Cadot | Such evidence is speculative without linking to apparent condition | Speculation, not enough to establish fact of appearance |
| Standard for Summary Judgment Evidence | Inferences from BAC and opinions create a disputed fact | Only direct or properly-linked circumstantial evidence is competent | Inferences on inferences insufficient for liability |
| Motion for Continuance | Needed more time to depose owner for material evidence | Plaintiff had considerable time and didn't exercise diligence | No abuse of discretion in denying continuance |
Key Cases Cited
- El Chico Corp. v. Poole, 732 S.W.2d 306 (Tex. 1987) (established provider liability under common law for serving intoxicated patrons; superseded by Dram Shop Act's stricter standard)
- F.F.P. Operating Partners, L.P. v. Duenez, 237 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. 2007) (clarified that Dram Shop Act requires proof of 'obvious intoxication')
- City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802 (Tex. 2005) (summary judgment standards described)
- Marathon Corp. v. Pitzner, 106 S.W.3d 724 (Tex. 2003) (evidence cannot rest on speculation or inference stacked on inference)
- Nat. Gas Pipeline Co. of Am. v. Justiss, 397 S.W.3d 150 (Tex. 2012) (speculative/conclusory testimony is incompetent for summary judgment)