Randy Reynolds, & Associates, Inc. v. Kasey Harmon
49588-1
| Wash. Ct. App. | Oct 31, 2017Background
- Reynolds (landlord) served Harmon (tenant) a 20-day termination notice; Harmon did not vacate and Reynolds obtained default judgment and a writ of restitution.
- Sheriff posted the writ; Harmon filed an ex parte motion to stay execution, claiming she had answered before the case was filed and default entered.
- A superior court commissioner granted the ex parte stay on a preprinted form that waived bond pending a show-cause hearing; Reynolds received no notice and no bond was posted.
- At the show-cause hearing the commissioner concluded Harmon had no legally sufficient challenge, lifted the stay, entered supplemental judgment for Reynolds and the writ was executed (Harmon evicted).
- Reynolds appealed only the ex parte grant of the stay and the waiver of the bond, arguing lack of notice under CR 5(a) and violation of RCW 59.18.390(1).
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Reynolds) | Defendant's Argument (Harmon) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the commissioner could hear Harmon’s motion ex parte without service under CR 5(a) | CR 5(a) mandates service on all parties for every written motion not authorized to be heard ex parte; no authority allowed ex parte consideration here, so Reynolds was entitled to notice | The commissioner implicitly treated the request as an emergency/scheduling matter and used the county’s preprinted form to stay execution | Court held CR 5(a) required notice; the ex parte hearing was improper and violated the Code of Judicial Conduct limits on ex parte communications |
| Whether waiving the bond without notice or hearing violated RCW 59.18.390(1) | RCW 59.18.390(1) uses “shall”: landlord must have notice of time/place to fix bond and opportunity to examine sureties; waiver without notice violated statute | Harmon relied on the commissioner’s discretionary waiver on the preprinted order and the emergency posture | Court held the statute requires notice and opportunity to be heard before approving or waiving the bond; waiver without notice was legal error |
| Whether the issue is moot (eviction completed) but nonetheless justiciable | Reynolds acknowledged mootness but argued the issue raises recurring public interest requiring guidance | Harmon relied on mootness since relief as to this tenancy could not be provided | Court exercised discretion to reach merits because issues involve statutory interpretation of landlord-tenant process, will recur, and may escape review |
| Whether Reynolds is entitled to appellate attorney fees under the lease | Lease provides prevailing party attorney fees for actions enforcing the agreement; Reynolds prevailed on appeal | Harmon did not contest applicability | Court awarded Reynolds appellate attorney fees to be determined under RAP 18.1 |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Det. of M.W., 185 Wn.2d 633 (discussing mootness and exceptions for matters of continuing public interest)
- State v. Watson, 155 Wn.2d 574 (use of Code of Judicial Conduct to define/examine improper ex parte communications)
- Buckley v. Snapper Power Equip. Co., 61 Wn. App. 932 (ex parte contacts violating CJC can warrant remedies under civil rules)
- Jafar v. Webb, 177 Wn.2d 520 (principles for interpreting court rules de novo)
- Jongeward v. BNSF Ry. Co., 174 Wn.2d 586 (statutory interpretation and giving effect to plain meaning)
- Scannell v. City of Seattle, 97 Wn.2d 701 (distinguishing permissive "may" from mandatory "shall")
- Hall v. Feigenbaum, 178 Wn. App. 811 (contractual attorney-fee provisions support fees on appeal)