Randall Shotts v. John Wetzel
2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15633
| 3rd Cir. | 2013Background
- Shotts was sentenced in 2001 to 30.5 to 133 years in Westmoreland County, PA, after pleading to multiple informations involving burglaries and related offenses.
- He received appointed counsel (Aston) for plea negotiations and sentencing and later faced a lengthy PCRA process with five different lawyers.
- Aston pursued a plea deal; Shotts rejected a ten-to-twenty year offer and pled guilty without a Commonwealth sentencing agreement; the judge later imposed a 30½ to 133 year aggregate sentence.
- Post-sentencing, Shotts’ direct appeal was not filed; his direct-appeal deadline expired during a confused sequence of counsel appointments.
- In July 2002, Shotts filed a PCRA petition raising ineffectiveness claims against Aston and others; the PCRA Court held an evidentiary hearing and denied relief, and the Pennsylvania Superior Court held the Hubbard rule default applied, but the claim was not preserved for review.
- Shotts filed a federal habeas petition; the district court dismissed as procedurally defaulted under Hubbard, and the Third Circuit granted a certificate of appealability to address whether Hubbard was exorbitantly applied and whether, on the merits, Aston was ineffective when not obtaining discovery or informing about maximum sentences.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the Hubbard rule’s default is exorbitant so as to permit federal review. | Shotts argues Hubbard’s application was exorbitant and improper. | Pa. and Hubbard maintain Hubbard is an adequate state bar. | Exorbitant application; federal review permitted. |
| Whether Aston’s alleged failure to obtain discovery was ineffective assistance. | Shotts contends discovery would have improved plea strategy. | Aston reasonably relied on Shotts’s confession; discovery not required for the plea. | Not deficient; no prejudice shown. |
| Whether Aston’s failure to inform Shotts of the aggregate maximum sentence was ineffective assistance. | Shotts argues lack of aggregate sentencing information misled plea decision. | Aston provided per-offense maximums and warned about potential aggregate increases; no guarantee given. | Not deficient; information provided was sufficient; no prejudice. |
Key Cases Cited
- Lee v. Kemna, 534 U.S. 362 (2002) (exorbitant application of a state rule can permit review)
- Hubbard, 372 A.2d 687 (Pa. 1977) (default rule for ineffectiveness claims under Hubbard)
- Grant v. Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 813 A.2d 726 (Pa. 2003) (overruled Hubbard in some collateral-review contexts)
- Commonwealth v. McGill, 832 A.2d 1014 (Pa. 2003) (layered ineffectiveness claims and Rule 905 procedure guide)
- Commonwealth v. Ligons, 971 A.2d 1125 (Pa. 2009) (unclear requirements for layering ineffectiveness claims)
- Day v. United States, 969 F.2d 39 (3d Cir. 1992) (necessity of information for reasonably informed plea decisions)
- Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376 (2012) (prejudice standard in plea bargaining context)
- Treviño v. Thaler, 133 S. Ct. 1911 (2013) (state procedural default and federal review interplay)
- Rolan v. Coleman, 680 F.3d 311 (3d Cir. 2012) (federal review when state court decision rests on procedural ground)