Ramos v. Nielsen
321 F. Supp. 3d 1083
N.D. Cal.2018Background
- TPS created in 1990; Secretary of Homeland Security may designate, extend, or terminate Temporary Protected Status for foreign states when armed conflict, environmental disaster, or other extraordinary temporary conditions prevent safe return. 8 U.S.C. §1254a.
- Four countries at issue: Sudan (designated 1997), Nicaragua (1999), El Salvador (2001), Haiti (2010); each had repeated extensions over many years; DHS announced terminations between Oct 2017–Jan 2018 affecting ~200,000 TPS holders and many U.S.-citizen children.
- Plaintiffs: nine TPS holders (from the four countries) and four U.S.-citizen children; allege long-established ties, employment, homes, and family integrity interests in U.S.
- Plaintiffs assert four claims: (1) substantive due process on behalf of U.S.-citizen children (family integrity), (2) equal protection (racial/national-origin animus), (3) substantive due process for TPS holders (property/liberty), and (4) APA violation for a sub silentio change in TPS interpretation/practice.
- Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction (citing 8 U.S.C. §1254a(b)(5)(A)) and for failure to state a claim; court held a hearing and denied the motion to dismiss in part, explaining reasoning in this opinion.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiffs' Argument | Defendants' Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Scope of §1254a(b)(5)(A) jurisdiction bar — does it preclude review of agency-wide policies or constitutional claims? | §1254a doesn't bar review of general policies or colorable constitutional claims; "determination" refers to country-by-country decisions, not agency practices. | §1254a's no-judicial-review language bars review of any determination, and thus precludes review of challenges to the Secretary's TPS decisions and related legal interpretations. | Court: §1254a bars review of individual factual determinations but does not clearly preclude review of collateral agency practices or colorable constitutional claims; jurisdictional dismissal denied. |
| APA claim — Did DHS unlawfully change practice by focusing only on original designation conditions without acknowledging or justifying the change? | DHS adopted a novel interpretation (statements from Kelly/Nielsen and terse termination notices) and departed from prior practice that considered intervening events; APA review allowed for a sub silentio-policy change. | DHS: termination notices are consistent with past practice; no unlawful unexplained change. | Court: Plaintiffs plausibly alleged a change in practice and lack of reasoned explanation; APA claim survives Rule 12(b)(6). |
| Equal protection — Were the TPS terminations motivated in part by racial/national-origin animus (attributable to DHS despite lack of direct evidence against Secretaries)? | Alleged direct and circumstantial evidence (President Trump's statements, White House pressure, sequence of events) plausibly show discriminatory purpose; Arlington Heights framework applies and animus can be imputed if the President influenced DHS decisions. | Government: President's statements irrelevant; plaintiffs must identify similarly situated comparators; AADC/Trump v. Hawaii require highly deferential review in immigration context. | Court: Arlington Heights applies; comparator not required; President's animus plausibly imputable to DHS; AADC and Trump do not foreclose review here because affected persons were lawfully present in U.S. and terminations were not national-security/entry decisions; equal protection claim survives. |
| Substantive due process — Do TPS beneficiaries or their U.S.-citizen children have protected liberty/property interests that bar termination absent sufficient governmental justification? | TPS holders have property or liberty interests in continued lawful presence conferred by statutory process; U.S.-citizen children have a strong family-integrity liberty interest; terminations without adequate justification violate substantive due process. | Government: Immigration authority is plenary; family-integrity interest does not bar enforcement of immigration laws; TPS is temporary and discretionary so no protected entitlement. | Court: Plaintiffs stated plausible due process claims at least insofar as terminations also implicate APA or equal protection violations; court expressed doubts about broad due-process rule but refused to dismiss now. |
Key Cases Cited
- McNary v. Haitian Refugee Ctr., 498 U.S. 479 (1991) (statutory "determination" language interpreted to bar review of individual benefits determinations but not collateral challenges to procedures/policies)
- Reno v. Catholic Social Servs., 509 U.S. 43 (1993) (followed McNary; collateral challenges to agency regulations may proceed despite statutory limits on review of individual determinations)
- Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592 (1988) (Congressional intent to preclude review of constitutional claims must be clear)
- Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967) (presumption favoring judicial review of administrative action; clear evidence required to preclude review)
- Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assn. v. State Farm, 463 U.S. 29 (1983) (arbitrary-and-capricious standard requires reasoned explanation for agency action)
- F.C.C. v. Fox Television Stations, 556 U.S. 502 (2009) (agency must acknowledge and explain changes in policy; reasoned decisionmaking required)
- Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018) (addressed review standard for entry/visa national-security proclamation; high deference where action regulates entry and implicates foreign affairs and national security)
- Starr v. Baca, 652 F.3d 1202 (9th Cir. 2011) (plaintiff's plausible explanation survives dismissal where two plausible alternative explanations exist)
- Leite v. Crane Co., 749 F.3d 1117 (9th Cir. 2014) (distinguishes facial vs factual jurisdictional attacks)