Ramos-Santiago v. WHM Carib, LLC, 919 F.3d 66

Background

Ramos-Santiago worked at Rio Mar resort since 1987; promoted to golf tournament coordinator and employed by Wyndham after 2007 acquisition. He was 60 at termination and had no prior discipline.
In 2012 Ramos-Santiago, working also as a PGA coordinator, received $300 coordination fee via check from Palmas del Mar; in 2013 he arranged for a $3,000 CELS prize check to be made out to him, cashed it, distributed $2,700 to winners and kept $300 without notifying Wyndham or CELS.
Resort officials learned of the check, investigated, suspended Ramos-Santiago, and after conflicting recommendations (some for termination, one for warning) the general director terminated him for unauthorized appropriation of funds on August 15, 2013.
Ramos-Santiago sued under Puerto Rico Law 100 (age discrimination) and sought derivative tort damages for his family; Wyndham moved for summary judgment on discrimination and derivative claims, which the district court granted; the unjust dismissal claim proceeded and later settled.
Ramos-Santiago filed a premature notice of appeal after partial summary judgment but before final judgment; the First Circuit treated the notice as relating forward under Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)(2) and exercised jurisdiction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
1. Jurisdiction — was the appeal premature?	Ramos filed notice after partial SJ but before final judgment; relied on Rule 4(a)(2) to save appeal.	Wyndham argued notice was premature and deprived appellate jurisdiction.	Court treated notice as relating forward under Rule 4(a)(2) because the partial SJ disposed of discrete claims and affirmed jurisdiction.
2. Whether Wyndham rebutted Law 100 presumption of age discrimination	Ramos assumed he established prima facie case and argued factual disputes precluded SJ.	Wyndham argued undisputed misconduct (unauthorized $300 appropriation) was a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for termination.	Court held Wyndham met its burden: undisputed facts showed misconduct justified termination.
3. Whether Ramos produced sufficient evidence of pretext/age animus	Ramos pointed to alleged disparate treatment (younger supervisor) and reassignment of duties to younger employees; argued investigation was pretext.	Wyndham argued the comparator was not similarly situated and reassignment is expected after firing; no evidence of age-based comments or bias.	Court held Ramos failed to produce evidence that age motivated termination; differential treatment and duty redistribution did not show pretext.
4. Denial of motion for reconsideration	Ramos reasserted legal error on summary judgment.	Wyndham defended district court's SJ analysis and denial of reconsideration as within discretion.	Court found no abuse of discretion and affirmed denial of reconsideration.

Key Cases Cited

Digital Equip. Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 511 U.S. 863 (1994) (defines when an order "ends the litigation on the merits" for Rule 4(a)(2))
Barrett ex rel. Estate of Barrett v. United States, 462 F.3d 28 (1st Cir. 2006) (applies Rule 4(a)(2) to premature appeals of partial dispositions by reference to hypothetical Rule 54(b) certification)
Lehman v. Revolution Portfolio LLC, 166 F.3d 389 (1st Cir. 1999) (administrative closings are not final adjudications)
Alvarez-Fonseca v. Pepsi Cola of P.R. Bottling Co., 152 F.3d 17 (1st Cir. 1998) (Law 100 framework and burden shifting in Puerto Rico age-discrimination claims)
Baralt v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 251 F.3d 10 (1st Cir. 2001) (explains Law 100 presumption and employer's burden to show discrimination was less probable)
Vélez v. Thermo King de P.R., Inc., 585 F.3d 441 (1st Cir. 2009) (differential treatment and "similarly situated" standard in discrimination context)
Soto-Feliciano v. Villa Cofresi Hotels, Inc., 779 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2015) (continuing need for job services relevant to reduction-in-force claims)