Ramona Smith v. Chrysler Group, L.L.C.
909 F.3d 744
| 5th Cir. | 2018Background
- 2013 Jeep Wrangler driven by Arthur Smith crashed and he died; autopsy showed 18% blood carbon-monoxide. The wrecked vehicle was not preserved for post-crash inspection.
- Chrysler issued a recall for some 2012–2013 Wranglers: transmission oil cooler (TOC) tube could contact the power-steering return tube, form a wear hole, leak transmission fluid, and potentially cause an underbody fire.
- Plaintiffs (decedent’s wife and children) sued Chrysler for strict products liability (design/marketing defect), negligence, breach of warranty, and DTPA violations, claiming the recall defect caused an underbody fire that incapacitated Smith.
- Plaintiffs’ fire expert (Dr. Michael Schulz) initially said the fire origin was undetermined; months after the expert-report deadline he submitted a supplemental report opining the recall defect was more likely the cause. District court struck the supplemental report as untimely and conclusory and granted summary judgment to Chrysler.
- Plaintiffs’ remaining expert, an accident reconstructionist (Andrew Webb), opined the vehicle was on fire before impact but expressly declined to opine on fire origin. Plaintiffs did not present admissible fire-cause expert testimony tying the TOC defect to the fire.
- District court awarded costs to Chrysler; plaintiffs’ objections based on impecuniosity and good faith were rejected. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the exclusion of the supplemental report, the summary judgment, and the costs award.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the supplemental expert report was admissible | Schulz’s supplemental report relied on newly produced documents about other Jeep fires and was proper supplementation under Rule 26 | Report added a new causation opinion based on information available before the expert-deadline and lacks reliable methodology | Court affirmed exclusion: report untimely/insufficiently reliable and conclusory; district court did not abuse discretion |
| Whether plaintiffs produced sufficient evidence of defect-causing-fire causation | Recall notice, CO level, and eyewitness burn-path photos suffice as circumstantial evidence of pre-crash underbody fire caused by TOC defect | Plaintiffs lack admissible fire-cause expert tying the TOC defect to ignition; circumstantial evidence alone is inadequate for complex fire causation | Court held plaintiffs failed to create a genuine issue of material fact on causation; summary judgment proper |
| Whether expert testimony was required to prove fire origin/causation | Plaintiffs argued circumstantial evidence and reconstructionist testimony could supply causation | Chrysler argued determining vehicle fire origin is beyond lay knowledge and requires expert proof | Court held expert testimony is required for complex vehicle-fire causation; reconstructionist’s opinion was insufficient because he disclaimed fire-origin opinion |
| Whether district court abused discretion in awarding costs to Chrysler | Plaintiffs argued financial hardship and good-faith suit justified denying costs | Chrysler argued prevailing-party costs presumptively recoverable under Rule 54 and §1920 | Court affirmed costs award; financial hardship alone does not compel denial and no abuse of discretion was shown |
Key Cases Cited
- In re Complaint of C.F. Bean L.L.C., 841 F.3d 365 (5th Cir. 2016) (standard of review for exclusion of expert testimony)
- Sims v. Kia Motors of Am., Inc., 839 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 2016) (expert differential-diagnostic methodology required to establish vehicle-fire causation)
- Mack Trucks, Inc. v. Tamez, 206 S.W.3d 572 (Tex. 2006) (expert testimony required where causation is beyond common knowledge)
- Gharda USA, Inc. v. Control Sols., Inc., 464 S.W.3d 338 (Tex. 2015) (complex causation theories require expert testimony and objective proof)
- Flock v. Scripto-Tokai Corp., 319 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2003) (circumstantial evidence can suffice where only one incendiary source exists)
- Pacheco v. Mineta, 448 F.3d 783 (5th Cir. 2006) (factors a court may consider in denying costs to a prevailing party)
- Moore v. CITGO Refining & Chem. Co., L.P., 735 F.3d 309 (5th Cir. 2013) (wealth of prevailing party alone does not justify reducing costs)
- Hyundai Motor Co. v. Rodriguez ex rel. Rodriguez, 995 S.W.2d 661 (Tex. 1999) (relationship between crashworthiness/merchantability and causation)
- Nissan Motor Co. v. Armstrong, 145 S.W.3d 131 (Tex. 2004) (requiring competent expert proof to establish causation in complex vehicle cases)