880 F.3d 100
3rd Cir.2018Background
- Ramon Williams, a Guyanese-born lawful permanent resident, pleaded guilty in Georgia (2006) to five counts of first-degree forgery under Ga. Code Ann. § 16-9-1(a) and served one year.
- DHS charged Williams with removability as an aggravated felon under the INA based on a conviction for an offense "relating to . . . forgery" (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(R); 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii)).
- The Immigration Judge and the BIA held Williams removable; he petitioned for review in the Third Circuit and sought BIA reconsideration after Mathis v. United States.
- Central legal question: whether Georgia’s forgery statute (which reaches "writing . . . purports to have been made by another . . . or by authority of one who did not give such authority") is an "offense relating to forgery" under the INA.
- The Third Circuit applies the categorical approach and, because of the INA’s "relating to" language, uses its "looser categorical approach" (surveying logical connections between statutes rather than requiring precise element-to-element matches).
Issues
| Issue | Williams' Argument | Government's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Georgia’s forgery statute covers conduct (false agency endorsement) outside the generic federal common-law forgery | Georgia statute is broader because it criminalizes signing genuine documents without authority (false agency endorsement), which lacks the facial falsity/core element of common-law forgery | Georgia’s statute may be broader in text, but Georgia prosecutes false agency endorsement as forgery only in theory; any such possibility is insufficient absent realistic probability | Held: There is a realistic probability Georgia prosecutes false agency endorsement under §16-9-1; even if elements don’t precisely match, false agency endorsement is logically connected to common-law forgery and therefore "relates to" forgery for INA purposes; conviction qualifies as aggravated felony |
| Whether the Georgia statute lacks an essential "legal efficacy" or "prejudice" element, making it overbroad (e.g., covering purely personal acts) | Georgia statute omits requirement that instrument be capable of affecting legal rights or causing prejudice, so it reaches non-forgery conduct | State intent-to-defraud element and practical application indicate the statute targets core forgery conduct; no realistic probability Georgia would prosecute purely personal, non-fraud acts as forgery | Held: Argument unpersuasive; Georgia’s intent-to-defraud element aligns with common-law forgery and no realistic probability the statute would be applied to purely personal conduct |
| Applicability of categorical vs. modified categorical approach | Williams argued Mathis shows Georgia statute is indivisible or overbroad | Government conceded aspects at oral argument; court assumed categorical approach applies for present purposes | Held: Court applied looser categorical approach (logical-connection test) appropriate for "relating to" language |
| Whether removal as aggravated felon here is an unconstitutional disproportionate punishment | Williams preserved argument for appeal | Government relied on precedent rejecting proportionality challenges to removal | Held: Court declined to consider on merits (bound by precedent holding removal is not punishment) |
Key Cases Cited
- Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184 (2013) (explains categorical approach and comparing elements, and realistic-probability standard)
- Mathis v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2243 (2016) (guidance on divisibility and the modified categorical approach)
- Drakes v. Zimski, 240 F.3d 246 (3d Cir. 2001) (use of common-law definitions and consideration of "relating to" language)
- Flores v. Attorney General, 856 F.3d 280 (3d Cir. 2017) (articulates "looser categorical approach" and logical/causal connection test)
- Singh v. Attorney General, 839 F.3d 273 (3d Cir. 2016) (realistic-probability framework for whether a state would apply a statute to conduct outside federal definition)
- Bobb v. Attorney General, 458 F.3d 213 (3d Cir. 2006) (common-law forgery core: intent to deceive; state statutes can relate to forgery even if broader)
- Vizcarra-Ayala v. Mukasey, 514 F.3d 870 (9th Cir. 2008) (contrasting view that statutes covering genuine instruments may fall outside "relating to" forgery)
- United States v. McGovern, 661 F.2d 27 (3d Cir. 1981) (articulates traditional common-law elements of forgery)