Ramon Gonzalez v. State of Florida Department of Management Services
683 F. App'x 738
11th Cir.2017Background
- Ramon Gonzalez, a Cuban national, worked as a maintenance supervisor for Florida's Division of Real Estate Development and Maintenance from Nov. 2010 until his termination in June 2013.
- Deputy Bureau Chief Daniel Eberhart allegedly told Gonzalez’s supervisor (N. Fernandez) he would not have hired Gonzalez because of his “heavy Cuban accent” and that he “spoke too loud.” Those remarks occurred roughly two years before termination.
- After N. Fernandez was fired in 2013, Eberhart began overseeing Gonzalez more directly and reported multiple complaints about Gonzalez’s communication style, alleged yelling at employees/tenants, and poor supervisory/maintenance practices.
- Specific misconduct cited: authorizing fence repair without payment mechanism, approving payment for an unacceptable light-pole repair, complaints from employees/tenants/vendors about loud/aggressive conduct.
- Division Director Berger and Human Resources relied on Eberhart’s reports and recommended termination for poor performance, insubordination, and conduct unbecoming; Gonzalez was an at-will “select exempt service” employee and was fired without formal warnings.
- Gonzalez sued under Title VII and the Florida Civil Rights Act alleging national-origin discrimination; the district court granted summary judgment for the Department, which the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether remarks about Gonzalez’s accent and loudness constitute direct evidence of national-origin discrimination | Eberhart’s comments about Gonzalez’s accent and loud voice are direct evidence showing discriminatory motive | Remarks were not tied directly to the termination decision and were made long before termination, so they are not direct evidence | Not direct evidence; remarks were temporally remote and not directly linked to the firing |
| Whether a "cat’s paw" theory imputes Eberhart’s bias to the ultimate decisionmaker | Eberhart’s biased reports influenced Berger’s recommendation, so his bias should be imputed | Even assuming cat’s paw applies, the statements are not direct evidence and other nondiscriminatory reasons exist | Court assumed cat’s paw arguendo but still found no direct evidence |
| Whether Gonzalez raised a genuine dispute of material fact under McDonnell Douglas/Burdine (prima facie and pretext) | Complaints about accent and failure to follow progressive-discipline policy plus declarations asserting satisfactory performance show pretext | Employer offered multiple legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons (performance, complaints, policy violations); progressive discipline was discretionary for at‑will select exempt employees | Gonzalez failed to show pretext as to each proffered reason; summary judgment for employer affirmed |
| Whether deviation from progressive‑discipline policy indicates pretext | Failure to warn or formally discipline suggests discriminatory pretext | Policy allowed discretionary discipline for select exempt at‑will employees; deviation alone not dispositive | Deviance from policy did not create a genuine issue of pretext |
Key Cases Cited
- Alvarez v. Royal Atl. Developers, Inc., 610 F.3d 1253 (11th Cir.) (discusses direct vs. circumstantial evidence and McDonnell Douglas framework)
- Scott v. Suncoast Beverage Sales, Ltd., 295 F.3d 1223 (11th Cir.) (defines direct evidence and addresses temporal remoteness of remarks)
- Wilson v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 376 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir.) (only blatant remarks constitute direct evidence)
- Akouri v. State of Florida Dep’t of Transp., 408 F.3d 1338 (11th Cir.) (example where statements constituted direct evidence)
- McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (framework for burden-shifting in discrimination cases)
- Texas Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (clarifies burdens under McDonnell Douglas)
- Chapman v. AI Transp., 229 F.3d 1012 (en banc) (plaintiff must rebut each legitimate reason offered)
- Flowers v. Troup Cty., Ga., Sch. Dist., 803 F.3d 1327 (11th Cir.) (courts do not second-guess employers’ nondiscriminatory business judgments)