Ramaco Resources, Inc. v. Charles Rollins, 19-1163

Claimant Charles Rollins suffered a non-work distal radius fracture on Jan. 5, 2018, underwent surgery and PT, and was released to full duty on April 9, 2018.
On April 20, 2018, while loosening a bolt at work, Rollins felt a "pop" in the same wrist; subsequent imaging showed a distal radius fracture and he reported the injury promptly.
The claim administrator denied compensability; the Office of Judges (OOJ) reversed (relying largely on treating surgeon Dr. McCleary) and the Board of Review affirmed, holding the April 20 event was a new compensable injury.
Employer Ramaco presented independent evaluations (Drs. Mukkamala, Stoll) and a radiologist (Dr. Luchs) concluding the January fracture had not fully healed and April 20 only aggravated the preexisting, noncompensable injury.
The West Virginia Supreme Court reversed the Board, concluding the preponderance of the evidence showed aggravation of a noncompensable preexisting fracture (not a discrete new injury) and that Gill v. City of Charleston barred compensability; the decision drew concurring and dissenting opinions on appellate fact‑finding and deference.

Issue	Rollins' Argument	Ramaco's Argument	Held
Whether the April 20, 2018 wrist event is a new compensable injury or merely an aggravation of the Jan. 5, 2018 noncompensable fracture	April 20 was a discrete new injury: immediate pain/swelling, treating surgeon concluded new fracture and greater displacement	April 20 only aggravated an unhealed, noncompensable Jan. 5 fracture; x‑rays and IME/radiologist support nonhealed status	Court held the preponderance shows aggravation of the prior noncompensable fracture (not a discrete new injury) and therefore not compensable under Gill
Whether the OOJ/Board erred by failing to apply Gill v. City of Charleston	Gill inapplicable because there was a discrete new injury	Gill requires denial if only aggravation of a noncompensable preexisting injury	Court held OOJ/Board failed to properly apply Gill and that Gill bars compensability here
Whether the Supreme Court properly reversed under the "clear error" standard (deference to factfinder)	Weight should be given to OOJ/Board findings and treating physician; appellate court should not reweigh evidence	Employer relied on x‑ray interpretations and multiple IME opinions to show OOJ erred factually	Court concluded that, even resolving in favor of OOJ, the record lacks sufficient support for OOJ's finding; reversal affirmed by majority but dissenters argued the Court impermissibly substituted its factfinding

Gill v. City of Charleston, 236 W. Va. 737, 783 S.E.2d 857 (W. Va. 2016) (preexisting noncompensable injury cannot be made compensable merely by aggravation; only a discrete new injury is compensable)
United States v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364 (U.S. 1948) (formulation of the "clearly erroneous" standard)
Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, N.C., 470 U.S. 564 (U.S. 1985) (deference to trial factfinder on credibility; limits on appellate reweighing)
Jordan v. State Workmen's Comp'r, 156 W. Va. 159, 191 S.E.2d 497 (W. Va. 1972) (issue whether employment aggravated preexisting condition is a question of fact)