Ralphs Grocery Co. v. Victory Consultants, Inc.
D070804
| Cal. Ct. App. | Nov 15, 2017Background
- Ralphs (and its Food-4-Less/Foods Co. banners) sued Victory Consultants and Jerry Mailhot after paid petition circulators set up in front of two Ralphs stores, allegedly obstructing fire lanes, blocking customer ingress/egress, harassing customers, and otherwise disrupting store operations.
- The stores’ sidewalks/aprons and immediate entrance areas are private property controlled exclusively by Ralphs and are configured to facilitate quick customer entry and exit (no plazas, seating, or other common-area amenities).
- Appellants obtained a temporary restraining order barring Respondents and their solicitors from using the store premises for petitioning; Respondents then filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike the trespass/injunction complaint.
- The superior court granted the anti-SLAPP motion after excluding portions of a private investigator’s declaration and finding Appellants failed to show a probability of prevailing because they offered no admissible evidence the solicitors were agents of Respondents.
- The Court of Appeal reversed, holding (1) the asserted trespass arose from unprotected conduct occurring on private property so anti-SLAPP protection did not apply, and (2) even if analyzed under the anti-SLAPP second prong, Appellants had shown minimal merit on trespass/agency.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the complaint arises from activity protected by the anti-SLAPP statute | Ralphs: the suit targets trespass/disruptive conduct on private property, not protected petitioning | Victory/Mailhot: signature gathering is petitioning/public speech and thus protected | Held: Anti-SLAPP not applicable—complaint challenges unprotected conduct on private property; Respondents failed to show the fronts of these specific stores were public forums |
| Whether the court properly excluded portions of the private investigator’s (Mendez) declaration | Ralphs: Mendez’s statements identifying the solicitor and attached business cards/paper are admissible evidence of agency | Respondents: Mendez repeats out-of-court statements (hearsay); those portions should be excluded | Held: Court correctly excluded the hearsay portions recounting the solicitor’s statements; however, the physical business card and paper handed to Mendez were admissible and considered |
| Whether the Pruneyard balancing (public-forum analysis) belongs in anti-SLAPP first or second prong | Ralphs: forum analysis must be resolved at the first prong to determine if challenged activity is protected | Victory: court treated forum analysis later | Held: Forum analysis is part of the first-prong inquiry—defendant must show a prima facie basis that conduct was protected; Respondents did not meet that burden |
| Whether Appellants demonstrated a probability of prevailing on trespass (including agency of solicitors) | Ralphs: evidence (store control, observer declarations, photos, business card/paper, Victory’s contractor form) establishes prima facie trespass and agency/minimal merit | Victory: solicitors were independent contractors and Victory lacks control, so no agency evidence | Held: Even under the second prong, Ralphs met the minimal-merit threshold for trespass and produced sufficient evidence to support a prima facie finding of agency; the anti-SLAPP should have been denied |
Key Cases Cited
- Baral v. Schnitt, 1 Cal.5th 376 (describing the two-step anti-SLAPP framework)
- Pruneyard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 23 Cal.3d 899 (establishing state-constitutional forum/balancing test for private shopping centers)
- Ralphs Grocery Co. v. United Food & Commercial Workers Union Local 8, 55 Cal.4th 1083 (distinguishing store-entrance areas from Pruneyard public forums)
- Lloyd Corp. v. Tanner, 407 U.S. 551 (private-property rule under the First Amendment)
- Navellier v. Sletten, 29 Cal.4th 82 (standard for plaintiff’s burden on anti-SLAPP second prong)
- Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif, 39 Cal.4th 260 (minimal merit standard to survive anti-SLAPP)
- Staples v. Hoefke, 189 Cal.App.3d 1397 (defining trespass as unlawful interference with possession)