592 S.W.3d 125
Tex.2019Background
- Stanford International Bank operated a long-running Ponzi scheme; the SEC uncovered it in 2009.
- Gary Magness (and related entities) invested heavily and withdrew funds after the SEC investigation; he received $88.2 million (including $79 million principal) and later repaid $700,000, leaving an $8.5 million net gain.
- Ralph S. Janvey was appointed Receiver and sued to claw back Magness’s withdrawals under the Texas Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act (TUFTA) and for unjust enrichment.
- A jury found Magness had inquiry notice of suspicious facts but also found a diligent inquiry would not have revealed the Ponzi scheme; the district court held Magness satisfied TUFTA’s good-faith defense for the principal; the Fifth Circuit reversed.
- The Fifth Circuit certified the question whether a transferee on inquiry notice who did not investigate (because investigation would have been futile) can nevertheless claim TUFTA’s good-faith defense.
- The Texas Supreme Court answered: a transferee on inquiry notice must, at minimum, conduct a diligent investigation to prove good faith; mere suspicion without inquiry is insufficient.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether a transferee on inquiry notice can invoke TUFTA §24.009(a) good-faith defense without investigating | Inquiry notice defeats good faith as a matter of law | If a diligent inquiry would have been futile, transferee lacks constructive knowledge and acted in good faith | No—transferee on inquiry notice must show it conducted a diligent investigation to prove good faith |
| Effect of a finding that a diligent inquiry would have been futile | Futility means no imputed knowledge; good faith can stand | Futility prevents imputation, so transferee is not charged with what an inquiry would show | Futility does not excuse failure to investigate; actual suspicious facts remain and an investigation is required; what an investigation would reveal may be imputed but does not eliminate the duty to investigate |
| What is the meaning of “good faith” under TUFTA | (Receiver relied on traditional badges of fraud to deny good faith) | Good faith means honesty and lack of willful ignorance | Good faith requires honesty in fact, reasonableness given known facts, and absence of willful ignorance |
| Scope of the Court’s answer (did the Court set full standards for diligence/inquiry?) | Receiver sought a clear rule that inquiry notice precludes defense | Magness urged limitations given jury findings about futility | Court limited its holding to the certified question: it requires investigation but does not define every circumstance where an investigation will suffice |
Key Cases Cited
- KCM Fin. LLC v. Bradshaw, 457 S.W.3d 70 (Tex. 2015) (describing TUFTA’s purpose to protect creditors)
- Janvey v. GMAG, L.L.C., 925 F.3d 229 (5th Cir. 2019) (Fifth Circuit opinion certifying the legal question to the Texas Supreme Court)
- Janvey v. Golf Channel, Inc., 487 S.W.3d 560 (Tex. 2016) (interpreting TUFTA’s reasonably equivalent value defense)
- R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Gulf Energy Expl. Corp., 482 S.W.3d 559 (Tex. 2016) (defining good faith concepts, including honesty in fact)
- Blum v. Simpson, 17 S.W. 402 (Tex. 1886) (suspicious circumstances can put transferee on inquiry notice)
- Woodward v. Ortiz, 237 S.W.2d 286 (Tex. 1951) (knowledge discoverable by diligence can be imputed)
- Ruebeck v. Hunt, 176 S.W.2d 738 (Tex. 1943) (knowledge that would spur inquiry is equivalent to knowledge of fraud)
- Wethered’s Administrator v. Boon, 17 Tex. 143 (Tex. 1856) (diligent investigation can defeat a finding of notice)
- Humphries v. Freeman, 22 Tex. 45 (Tex. 1858) (discussing notice by ordinary diligence)
