Ralph Cantafio, David Feeder, Lilly Lentz, Mike Lazar, Cantafio & Song PLLC, Mark Fischer, and Patricia Ann Scott, Petitioners: v. Kaylee Schnelle. Respondent:
2025 CO 39
| Colo. | 2025Background
- This case concerns a prior lawsuit in which Patricia Ann Scott sued real estate agent Kaylee Schnelle for professional negligence related to the sale of real property.
- In that earlier case, Schnelle moved for summary judgment and, later, a directed verdict; both were denied, but the jury ultimately found for Schnelle.
- Schnelle then brought a new case, claiming Scott and her attorneys maliciously prosecuted her in the original suit, asserting they lacked probable cause to sue.
- The defendants (Scott and her legal team) moved to dismiss, arguing that the prior denials of their summary judgment and directed verdict motions established probable cause for the original lawsuit as a matter of law, or at least created a rebuttable presumption.
- The district court and Court of Appeals refused to adopt such a rule, instead saying such denials are just factors in the probable cause analysis for a malicious prosecution claim—not dispositive or presumptive.
- The Colorado Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve whether a denial of summary judgment or directed verdict raises a rebuttable presumption of probable cause in subsequent malicious prosecution actions.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument (Schnelle) | Defendant's Argument (Scott et al.) | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Does denial of summary judgment/direct verdict in prior case create a rebuttable presumption of probable cause in a malicious prosecution suit? | Denial is not a sufficient proxy for probable cause, as denials can occur for many reasons not bearing on the merits. | Denials should create, at minimum, a rebuttable presumption of probable cause to protect against baseless malicious prosecution claims. | No; denial of such motions is only a factor—no presumption is created. |
Key Cases Cited
- Hewitt v. Rice, 154 P.3d 408 (Colo. 2007) (elements of malicious prosecution)
- Wolfinger v. Cheche, 80 P.3d 783 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003) (denial of summary judgment as a factor, not dispositive, for probable cause)
- Bacon v. Reimer & Braunstein, LLP, 929 A.2d 723 (Vt. 2007) (denial of summary judgment may be persuasive but is not an absolute bar to malicious prosecution claims)
- Walford v. Blinder, Robinson & Co., 793 P.2d 620 (Colo. App. 1990) (probable cause in malicious prosecution)
- Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Pherson, 272 P.2d 643 (Colo. 1954) (probable cause defeats malicious prosecution claims)