Raines v. Lehigh Hanson Services LLC
2:23-cv-01539
E.D. Cal.Oct 5, 2023Background
- Plaintiff Walter L. Raines worked for defendants from ~July 2018 to June 30, 2022; Martin Marietta acquired Lehigh’s California subsidiaries in Oct. 2021 and became Raines’s employer by May 2022. He was covered by collective bargaining agreements while employed.
- Raines filed a putative class action alleging California wage-and-hour violations (meal/rest breaks), invoking Wage Order 9, Cal. Lab. Code § 512, and § 226.7. Case was filed in state court and removed by Martin to federal court.
- Martin moved to dismiss the third cause of action (meal/rest break claims tied to Wage Order 9 and § 512/§226.7) and to dismiss Doe defendants. Plaintiff indicated he would concede Wage Order 9 inapplicable and intended to re-plead under Wage Order 4.
- Martin argued § 226.7 is derivative and cannot stand without predicate violations (Wage Order 9/§ 512); Martin also sought to strike Doe defendants as disfavored.
- The Court dismissed the third cause of action for failure to state a claim but granted leave to amend; the Court denied dismissal of Doe defendants, finding the Complaint sufficiently alleges their involvement and discovery may identify them.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Validity of third cause of action (meal/rest break claims invoking Wage Order 9 and § 512/§226.7) | Raines alleged violations under Wage Order 9 and § 512 and seeks recovery under § 226.7 | Martin: Wage Order 9 inapplicable (not a transportation employer); § 512 claim fails; § 226.7 is derivative and cannot stand without a predicate violation | Court: Third cause lacks a cognizable legal theory and is dismissed with leave to amend (plaintiff conceded Wage Order 9/§512 issues) |
| Preclusion of future re-pleading under Wage Order 4 and § 226.7 | Raines intends to amend and re-plead under Wage Order 4 instead of Wage Order 9 | Martin sought to bar Raines from re-pleading the same claim under Wage Order 4 | Court: Declined to foreclose future claims at this stage; limited to pleading before it and permitted amendment so parties may litigate in context of amended complaint |
| Dismissal of Doe defendants | Raines: Doe defendants are proper where identities unknown and may be revealed through discovery; Complaint incorporates Doe acts into named-defendant allegations | Martin: Ninth Circuit disfavors John/Jane Doe defendants and seeks dismissal | Court: Denied dismissal of Doe defendants; found sufficient factual incorporation and notice to permit discovery to identify them |
Key Cases Cited
- Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (U.S. 2009) (pleading standard: factual allegations must plausibly state a claim)
- Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (U.S. 2007) (plausibility pleading standard)
- Gillespie v. Civiletti, 629 F.2d 637 (9th Cir. 1980) (permitting Doe defendants when identities unknown and discoverable)
- Godecke v. Kinetic Concepts, Inc., 937 F.3d 1201 (9th Cir. 2019) (dismissal where complaint lacks cognizable legal theory)
- Falck N. Cal. Corp. v. Scott Griffith Collaborative Sols., LLC, 25 F.4th 763 (9th Cir. 2022) (limits on appellate review tied to operative complaint and procedural posture)
- Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988 (9th Cir. 2018) (principles on incorporation by reference and pleadings)
- Parrino v. FHP, Inc., 146 F.3d 699 (9th Cir. 1998) (procedural principles regarding amendment and pleadings)