Ragan v. Secretary Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, 687 F. App'x 177

In 1990 Derrick Ragan was tried and convicted of first-degree murder for shooting Anthony Thomas; key witness Steven Guilford initially identified Ragan but recanted at trial.
Prosecution argued recantations resulted from intimidation by Ragan or relatives and presented motive and forensic evidence tying the shots to Ragan’s seating position. Defense offered character testimony.
At trial the prosecution introduced a prior police statement in which Victor Ragan allegedly relayed an admission by Derrick; trial counsel did not object. A separate eyewitness, Martino Crews, gave inconsistent statements about whether a shooter exited the passenger side; none were presented at trial.
Ragan exhausted state appeals and multiple PCRA petitions; federal habeas proceedings followed, with the District Court denying relief and this appeal before the Third Circuit.
Ragan raised three principal federal claims on habeas: (1) trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to admissible-out‑of‑court statement (double hearsay); (2) counsel was ineffective for failing to introduce Crews’ statements; (3) prosecutorial misconduct in questioning Ms. Guilford about ties to Ragan’s family.

Issue	Ragan's Argument	State/Government Argument	Held
Trial counsel ineffective for not objecting to Victor-relayed admission (double hearsay)	Failure to object to hearsay admission was deficient and prejudicial	Statement was offered to explain recantation (non-hearsay) so objection would be meritless	Denied — no deficiency because evidence was admissible as non-hearsay under state law; AEDPA deference applies
Counsel ineffective for not introducing Crews’s inconsistent eyewitness statements	Crews’s statements would have exculpated Ragan and counsel’s omission was deficient and prejudicial	Crews’s statements were inconsistent and would have limited impact; no reasonable probability of different result	Denied on merits — even if admissible, recantation and strong case evidence negate Strickland prejudice
Prosecutorial misconduct from questioning Ms. Guilford about relations to Ragan family	Questions and photos sought to inflate prejudice by implying criminal records, depriving due process	Questions were probative of intimidation theory; court gave limiting instruction	Denied — curative jury instruction and strong evidence supporting conviction cured any unfairness
Procedural default/excuse via PCRA counsel failure (related to Crews claim)	Initial PCRA counsel’s omission excuses default under Martinez	State disputes but court assumed potential excuse and reached merits	Court declined to resolve default; denied claim on merits (no prejudice under Strickland)

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (two-prong ineffective assistance standard: deficient performance and prejudice)
Premo v. Moore, 562 U.S. 115 (2011) (AEDPA deference principles in ineffective-assistance claims)
Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170 (2011) (highly deferential review of state-court decisions under AEDPA)
Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (prosecution’s duty to disclose exculpatory evidence)
Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1 (2012) (narrow equitable exception to procedural default when initial-review counsel was ineffective)
Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991) (procedural default and cause-and-prejudice standard)
Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) (prosecutorial misconduct requires showing trial unfairness to violate due process)
United States v. Morena, 547 F.3d 191 (3d Cir. 2008) (consider improper actions, weight of properly admitted evidence, and curative instructions)
United States v. Sanders, 165 F.3d 248 (3d Cir. 1999) (failure to raise meritless argument cannot constitute ineffective assistance)