Rafert v. Meyer, 298 Neb. 461

Background

Jlee Rafert purchased life insurance naming an irrevocable trust (created 2009) as owner; Robert J. Meyer served as trustee and signed applications listing a South Dakota address he did not use.
Insurance premiums were paid initially, then renewal premiums were given to agent Gerald C. Bryce (through his agency Ag/Insurance Services, Inc. and Paradigm), but Bryce stole the renewal payments and the policies lapsed without Meyer or Rafert learning of it.
Rafert and her children sued trustee Meyer for breach of fiduciary duty seeking recovery of premiums; Meyer asserted third-party claims against Bryce, Paradigm, and Ag for contribution/indemnity, alleging their negligence caused the lapse.
The trial court bifurcated proceedings; after a jury verdict for plaintiffs against Meyer (damages ~ $60,000 plus attorney fees), the court entered judgment on November 9, 2016.
The district court then certified that November 9, 2016 judgment as final under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1), and plaintiffs filed a notice of appeal; the Nebraska Supreme Court considered whether certification was proper and whether it had jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court concluded the trial court abused its discretion in certifying the partial judgment (insufficient findings, interrelated third-party claims, and no unusual hardship), vacated the certification order, and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether the district court properly certified a partial final judgment under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1)	Rafert: certification appropriate because third-party claim delay would stall appeal; adjudicated issues separable and appellate review wouldn’t be duplicative	Meyer/third-party defs: certification necessary to allow review that might moot third-party litigation; delay in trying third-party claims justified certification	Court held certification was an abuse of discretion and vacated it — appeal dismissed for lack of jurisdiction
Whether the adjudicated and remaining claims are sufficiently separable to warrant immediate appeal	Plaintiffs: claims are separable; appealable now	Third-party defs: third-party claim dependent on outcome; overlapping facts and issues	Court held claims were factually and legally overlapping; fragmentation unwarranted
Whether the trial court provided adequate findings to justify § 25-1315(1) certification	Plaintiffs: statutory language suffices; court’s hearing comments showed concern about delay	Trial court: gave minimal reasoning at hearing and used statutory language in order	Court held trial court failed to make specific findings explaining why certification was needed; such reasoning is ordinarily required
Whether delay in third-party trial (3–4 months) justified interlocutory appeal	Plaintiffs: delay and litigation age (since 2013) create hardship supporting certification	Defendants: delay is modest and not an unusual hardship; § 25-1315 not intended to multiply appeals on speculative grounds	Court held speculative or modest delay does not meet the “unusual case” standard for certification

Key Cases Cited

Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639, 889 N.W.2d 825 (2017) (jurisdictional standards and final-order timing under Nebraska law)
Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, 291 Neb. 163, 864 N.W.2d 391 (2015) (§ 25-1315(1) certification reserved for unusual cases; need for trial court findings)
Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800, 733 N.W.2d 877 (2007) (factors for certifying final judgment and caution against fragmentation)
AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Radtke, 218 Neb. 386, 356 N.W.2d 856 (1984) (purpose and policy of third-party practice: avoid multiplicity of suits)
Sand Livestock Sys. v. Svoboda, 17 Neb. App. 28, 756 N.W.2d 299 (2008) (failure to provide detailed findings may warrant appellate scrutiny)