Rafert v. Meyer
298 Neb. 461
Neb.2017Background
- Jlee Rafert purchased life insurance naming an irrevocable trust (created 2009) as owner; Robert Meyer served as trustee and signed applications listing a South Dakota address he did not monitor.
- Insurance agent Gerald Bryce solicited the policies, collected large renewal-premium checks from Rafert between 2010–2012, and stole those funds; policies lapsed without Meyer or Rafert being notified.
- Rafert and her children sued Meyer for breach of fiduciary duty seeking recovery of premiums; Meyer asserted Bryce, Paradigm, and Ag as third-party defendants for contribution/indemnity.
- After a jury verdict in favor of Rafert for roughly $60,000, the district court entered judgment and then, before trial on Meyer’s third-party claims, certified the judgment as final under Neb. Rev. Stat. § 25-1315(1).
- The district court’s certification order used statutory language but gave no detailed findings; appellants appealed immediately and the Nebraska Supreme Court sua sponte considered jurisdiction over the appeal.
- The Supreme Court concluded certification was an abuse of discretion because the adjudicated and remaining claims were factually and legally interrelated and the record did not show an unusual need for immediate appellate review.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether the district court properly certified its November 9, 2016 judgment as final under § 25-1315(1) | Rafert: immediate appeal appropriate; third-party proceedings won’t affect issues on appeal and won’t require duplicative review | Meyer/district court: certification needed to avoid long delay (trial of third-party claims months away) and to permit early review that could moot later trial | Court vacated certification and dismissed appeal for lack of jurisdiction — certification was an abuse of discretion |
| Whether § 25-1315(1) requirements were met | Rafert: requirements met because multiple parties/claims and court expressly found no just reason for delay | Meyer: same — court complied with statutory text and practical concerns of delay | Court: statutory elements formally met, but the crucial "no just reason for delay" finding lacked supporting reasoned findings; certification improper |
| Whether the adjudicated and unadjudicated claims were separable enough to warrant certification | Rafert: claims are separable; third-party contribution is distinct from fiduciary breach | Meyer/third-party Ds: third-party liability depends on outcome of main claim but argued contribution won’t raise same issues | Court: claims are factually and legally overlapping (third-party practice aims to avoid multiplicity); separability not shown |
| Whether district court abused discretion by failing to make specific findings when certifying | Rafert: statutory language sufficient and court comments indicated concern about delay | Meyer: practical delay justified certification | Court: trial court should ordinarily make specific findings; absence of reasoning undermines deference and supports vacatur |
Key Cases Cited
- Guardian Tax Partners v. Skrupa Invest. Co., 295 Neb. 639 (2017) (addresses appellate jurisdiction and final-order timing)
- Castellar Partners v. AMP Limited, 291 Neb. 163 (2015) (explains limited, "unusual case" use of § 25-1315 certification and need for reasoned findings)
- Cerny v. Todco Barricade Co., 273 Neb. 800 (2007) (lists factors trial courts should weigh when certifying partial final judgments)
- AgriStor Credit Corp. v. Radtke, 218 Neb. 386 (1984) (describes purpose and function of third-party practice to avoid multiplicity of suits)