Rafael A. Faulkner v. State of Indiana (mem. dec.), 79A05-1605-CR-1103

On Aug. 24, 2015, Sergeant Hainje responded to an apartment complex to retrieve keys for a terminated employee and smelled marijuana in a common hallway.
Hainje knocked on Apartment B; Faulkner opened the door, acknowledged others were inside, retrieved keys, and began to close the door.
Hainje placed his hand on the closing door, stepped across the threshold, entered the apartment, directed occupants to sit, and then privately asked Faulkner for consent to search.
After being given Miranda and Pirtle warnings, Faulkner showed an ashtray containing two small marijuana cigarettes; he was arrested and charged with misdemeanors and one possession count.
Faulkner moved to suppress evidence from the warrantless entry; the trial court denied suppression, he was tried by bench trial, convicted, and appealed.
The Court of Appeals reversed, holding the warrantless entry lacked exigent-circumstances justification and Faulkner’s subsequent consent was tainted by the illegal entry.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument (State)	Defendant's Argument (Faulkner)	Held
Whether warrantless entry into Faulkner’s apartment was justified by exigent circumstances (imminent destruction of evidence)	Entry was justified because officers smelled marijuana, heard activity and movement, and officers reasonably feared evidence would be destroyed	Entry was not supported by objective, reasonable fear of imminent destruction; sounds and air freshener do not amount to exigency	Reversed: no sufficient evidence of an objective, reasonable fear of imminent destruction; exigent-circumstances exception did not apply
Whether Faulkner’s consent to search was voluntary and purged the taint of the illegal entry	Consent was voluntary; Miranda and Pirtle warnings were given, so evidence should be admissible	Consent was the product of an illegal entry and the coercive atmosphere; warnings did not cure the primary taint given temporal proximity and lack of intervening circumstances	Held consent was invalid as it was the product of the illegal entry; warnings did not purge the taint

Clark v. State, 994 N.E.2d 252 (Ind. 2013) (framework for reviewing admissibility following denial of a suppression motion)
Carpenter v. State, 18 N.E.3d 998 (Ind. 2014) (trial court’s admissibility rulings reviewed for abuse of discretion; constitutional questions de novo)
Berry v. State, 704 N.E.2d 462 (Ind. 1998) (Fourth Amendment protections extend to states via Fourteenth Amendment)
Straub v. State, 749 N.E.2d 593 (Ind. Ct. App. 2001) (home entry as chief evil guarded by warrant requirement; exigent-circumstances categories)
Holder v. State, 847 N.E.2d 930 (Ind. 2006) (warrantless searches are per se unreasonable except for established exceptions)
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (establishes limits on warrantless searches and recognized exceptions)
Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452 (2011) (exigent-circumstances doctrine requires a genuine exigency)
Esquerdo v. State, 640 N.E.2d 1023 (Ind. 1994) (requirements for destruction-of-evidence exigency; State must show objective, reasonable fear)
Galvin v. State, 582 N.E.2d 421 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991) (factors to determine whether consent following unlawful entry is sufficiently attenuated)
Ware v. State, 782 N.E.2d 478 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003) (consent given shortly after warrantless entry was not voluntary; coercive effect of illegal entry relevant)
Snellgrove v. State, 469 N.E.2d 337 (Ind. 1991) (emphasizes protection against intrusions into the home)