Rael v. Smith's Food & Drug Centers, Inc., 712 F. App'x 802

Background

Thomas Rael worked 25 years as a meat cutter for Smith’s under a collective bargaining agreement (CBA); he resigned in December 2014 alleging constructive discharge after repeated harassment by his supervisor Arturo Suazo.
Rael alleged Suazo called him names (e.g., “old man”), criticized his speed (linked to a workplace injury), and told him to find another job; Rael complained to managers and HR but alleges no effective remedy.
Rael sued Smith’s and Suazo under New Mexico law for intentional infliction of emotional distress (IIED) and prima facie tort.
Defendants moved to dismiss, arguing the state-law tort claims are preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). The district court dismissed; Rael appealed.
The Tenth Circuit reviewed de novo whether § 301 preemption applies and affirmed dismissal, holding evaluation of Rael’s claims requires interpretation of the CBA and thus is preempted.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether Rael’s IIED claim is preempted by § 301	Rael: his IIED arises from supervisor harassment outside a disciplinary/arbitral context and can be resolved by state law without interpreting the CBA	Defendants: resolving whether conduct was “outrageous” or justified requires construing CBA terms (discipline, harassment rules, grievance/arbitration process)	Preempted — IIED claim requires interpretation of CBA; § 301 applies (affirmed)
Whether the prima facie tort claim is preempted by § 301	Rael: claim is an independent state tort not requiring CBA interpretation	Defendants: whether conduct was justified ties to contractual rights/discipline provisions and grievance/arbitration scheme	Preempted — resolution requires reference to CBA; claim dismissed
Whether the Smith’s CBA lacked a grievable procedure for harassment claims (affecting preemption)	Rael: anti-harassment clause is aspirational/ambiguous and not clearly grievable, so arbitration/grievance route unavailable	Smith’s: CBA grievance language is broad (grievances over interpretation or application of Agreement) and arbitration is the final step; arbitrator should interpret CBA first	Court: broad grievance clause makes claims grievable; arbitrator would interpret CBA — supports § 301 preemption
Whether individual claims against supervisor Suazo avoid preemption	Rael: claims against an individual supervisor should not be swept into § 301 preemption	Defendants: supervisor acted within scope of employment; precedent holds IIED claims against supervisors can be preempted	Preempted — panel relied on circuit precedent (Steinbach) and rejected Rael’s unsupported contention

Key Cases Cited

Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202 (1985) (§ 301 requires federal common law and preempts state rules that define contract terms; resolution requires federal law when CBA interpretation is necessary)
Lingle v. Norge Div. of Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399 (1988) (state-law claims are preempted by § 301 only when their resolution requires interpreting a CBA)
Johnson v. Beatrice Foods Co., 921 F.2d 1015 (10th Cir. 1990) (IIED claim preempted where evaluating ‘‘outrageousness’’ requires considering CBA rights; binding Tenth Circuit precedent)
Albertson’s, Inc. v. Carrigan, 982 F.2d 1478 (10th Cir. 1993) (IIED claim not preempted where alleged conduct—fabricating shoplifting arrest—could be adjudicated without interpreting CBA)
Fry v. Airline Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 88 F.3d 831 (10th Cir. 1996) (IIED claims based on extreme, non-contractual union conduct need not be preempted when conduct is not arguably sanctioned by the collective bargain)
Garley v. Sandia Corp., 236 F.3d 1200 (10th Cir. 2001) (part of IIED claim preempted but claims based on retaliatory acts after arbitration ruling were not preempted)
Steinbach v. Dillon Cos., 253 F.3d 538 (10th Cir. 2001) (IIED claim against employer and supervisor preempted where resolution requires CBA interpretation)