Radwan v. Manuel, 55 F.4th 101

Background

In Nov. 2014 UConn women’s soccer player Noriana Radwan flashed her middle finger to an ESPNU camera during a postgame celebration; she was immediately suspended from upcoming NCAA tournament games and the AAC issued a letter of reprimand.
Coach Leonard Tsantiris recommended, and AD Warde Manuel approved, mid‑year cancellation of Radwan’s one‑year, full athletic scholarship for “serious misconduct”; Financial Aid Services sent a cancellation letter with an appeal window that Radwan sought to meet but was later told she missed.
Radwan transferred to Hofstra for spring 2015 and later sued UConn and individual officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (First Amendment and procedural due process) and Title IX (sex discrimination); district court granted defendants summary judgment on all remaining federal claims.
On appeal the Second Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the individual defendants on the First Amendment and due process claims (both on qualified immunity grounds), but held Radwan raised triable issues under Title IX and vacated summary judgment for UConn on that claim.
The court ruled (a) Radwan’s one‑year, for‑cause scholarship constitutes a constitutionally protected property interest, but (b) the officials were entitled to qualified immunity because that right was not clearly established when the scholarship was revoked.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
First Amendment — discipline for gesture while representing school	Radwan: showing the middle finger—even if offensive—was protected expressive conduct; universities cannot punish viewpoint‑based student speech in this context	UConn/officials: conduct was unsportsmanlike, public, and school‑related; officials reasonably relied on K‑12 precedents allowing regulation of offensive student speech; qualified immunity applies	Court: assumed speech might be protected but affirmed summary judgment for individual defendants on qualified immunity — law not clearly established for disciplining university athletes for vulgar on‑field conduct
Procedural due process — property interest in scholarship	Radwan: one‑year scholarship terminable only for cause created a legitimate entitlement protected by due process	Defendants: no constitutionally protected property interest; even if so, appeal was untimely and officials entitled to immunity	Court: scholarship is a protected property interest ( fixed term + for‑cause ), but officials entitled to qualified immunity because that rule was not clearly established at the time
Title IX — selective enforcement / disparate treatment	Radwan: UConn treated male student‑athletes who committed similar or worse misconduct more leniently; inconsistencies and procedural irregularities support inference of sex‑based motive	UConn: comparators were not similarly situated (different facts and decisionmakers); legitimate nondiscriminatory reason (serious misconduct) justified penalty	Court: evidence (multiple male comparators, inconsistent explanations, procedural anomalies) raises genuine fact issues; vacated summary judgment for UConn and remanded to proceed to trial

Key Cases Cited

Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (student political expression protected absent substantial disruption)
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260 (1988) (schools may regulate school‑sponsored student speech)
Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675 (1986) (schools may discipline lewd/offensive student speech)
Papish v. Bd. of Curators of Univ. of Mo., 410 U.S. 667 (1973) (college student not punishable for distributing indecent material off‑campus without school sponsorship)
Mahanoy Area Sch. Dist. v. B.L., 141 S. Ct. 2038 (2021) (public school limits on off‑campus student speech are narrower; context matters)
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (gestures and profane speech may be protected expression)
District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577 (2018) (qualified immunity two‑part test: violation + clearly established law)
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (2009) (courts may decide qualified immunity prongs in either order)
Ashcroft v. al‑Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 (2011) (existing precedent must place the constitutional question beyond debate for clear‑establishment)