Radu v. Herndon & Herndon Investigations, Inc.
302 Mich. App. 363
| Mich. Ct. App. | 2013Background
- Dec. 17, 2005: Walter Radu’s 2004 Jeep caught fire; vehicle towed to an outdoor storage lot. ACIA (insurer) denied claim and hired Herndon & Herndon Investigations; Timothy Herndon inspected the vehicle Jan. 2, 2006 and concluded the fuel line was severed and the fire was incendiary.
- Detective Charles Farley (Oakland County) inspected Jan. 6, 2006, concurred that the fuel line was severed (about 18" missing), and submitted reports to the prosecutor; Walter was bound over but prosecution later nolle prossed.
- Plaintiffs settled with ACIA in 2008 via a general release, settlement, and nondisclosure agreement; the release recited that ACIA, its employees and representatives were released. Herndon was a signatory to the nondisclosure agreement but not the release.
- Plaintiffs filed a 2009 suit alleging malicious prosecution, injurious falsehood, interference with economic relations, IIED, negligence/gross negligence, invasion of privacy, abuse of process, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (due process and equal protection) against Herndon defendants and Farley.
- Trial court granted Herndon defendants' summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7) based on the ACIA release and statutory immunity (MCL 29.4(6) and MCL 500.4509(3)); it granted Farley summary disposition on governmental immunity (and MCR 2.116(C)(10) for § 1983). Plaintiffs appealed.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether Herndon defendants are covered by plaintiffs’ 2008 release with ACIA | Release did not cover Herndon because they were independent contractors, not ACIA "representatives"; Herndon wasn’t a signatory to the release | Herndon investigators acted as ACIA’s representatives in investigating the claim and thus fall within the release language | Affirmed in part: Herndon defendants were "representatives" under the release (so claims barred). Trial court erred to the extent it found Herndon personally a signatory to the release — that portion vacated |
| Whether Herndon defendants are entitled to statutory immunity under MCL 29.4(6) and MCL 500.4509(3) | Herndon acted with malice or reckless disregard (ignored evidence like shiny, unburned edges and cotton fibers), so immunity’s malice exception applies | Statutes protect persons furnishing information to authorities absent malice; Herndon had no evidence of knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard | Affirmed: no admissible evidence that Herndon knew statements were false or recklessly disregarded truth; immunity applies |
| Whether Farley is protected by governmental immunity for state-law claims (including intentional torts and gross negligence) | Farley acted with malice, bad faith, and gross negligence (late/tardy investigation, poor preservation, misleading statements, reliance on Herndon) — immunity does not apply | Farley acted within scope, performed a reasonably thorough investigation, had corroborating expert evidence, and did not act with gross negligence or malice | Affirmed: Farley entitled to governmental immunity; plaintiffs did not raise facts showing gross negligence or lack of good faith |
| Whether plaintiffs stated a viable § 1983 malicious-prosecution/due process claim against Farley | Farley influenced prosecution and supplied false information to establish probable cause; nolle prosequi does not negate claim | Farley merely submitted reports/request for review; probable cause supported bindover; plaintiffs failed to show deprivation of liberty as required | Affirmed: § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim fails — no evidence of knowing falsehood or participation in prosecution decision, probable cause existed, and plaintiffs failed to show required deprivation of liberty |
Key Cases Cited
- Spiek v. Dep’t of Transp., 456 Mich. 331 (Michigan Supreme Court 1998) (standard of review for summary disposition)
- Feyz v. Mercy Mem. Hosp., 475 Mich. 663 (Michigan Supreme Court 2006) (definition of malice as knowledge or reckless disregard applied to immunity contexts)
- Odom v. Wayne County, 482 Mich. 459 (Michigan Supreme Court 2008) (governmental immunity / good faith requirement for intentional torts)
- Maiden v. Rozwood, 461 Mich. 109 (Michigan Supreme Court 1999) (gross negligence standard for overcoming governmental immunity)
- Jackson v. Saginaw County, 458 Mich. 141 (Michigan Supreme Court 1998) (when immunity questions are legal if no factual dispute)
- Pierce v. City of Lansing, 265 Mich. App. 174 (Michigan Court of Appeals 2005) (immunity question is legal if facts undisputed)
- Ireland v. Edwards, 230 Mich. App. 607 (Michigan Court of Appeals 1998) (definition of actual malice in defamation context)
- Fisher v. Blankenship, 286 Mich. App. 54 (Michigan Court of Appeals 2009) (malicious-prosecution § 1983 elements discussion)
- Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657 (U.S. Supreme Court 1989) (reckless disregard and purposeful avoidance of truth in defamation context)
- Sykes v. Anderson, 625 F.3d 294 (Sixth Circuit 2010) (elements of § 1983 malicious-prosecution claim)