Radtke v. Lifecare Management Partners
417 App. D.C. 422
| D.C. Cir. | 2015Background
- Plaintiffs Kathy Radtke and Carmen Cunningham were medical records coders who sued their former employers, Lifecare Management Partners and Advanta Medical Solutions, alleging unpaid overtime in violation of the FLSA.
- Defendants claimed the employees were exempt from overtime under the FLSA administrative and professional exemptions (29 C.F.R. §§ 541.200, 541.300); compensation levels were not disputed.
- At trial, plaintiffs offered time records and testimony showing they spent most of their time coding (Cunningham ~75%; Radtke ~92%), while defendants introduced evidence describing supervisory, training, and project work the employers say required discretion and specialized knowledge.
- The jury found the employees non-exempt and awarded judgment for plaintiffs. The district court denied defendants’ motions for judgment as a matter of law, a new trial, and to alter the judgment.
- Defendants appealed, arguing (1) no reasonable jury could find plaintiffs non-exempt, and (2) trial errors (stricken testimony, alleged contradictory testimony without a perjury instruction, and an opening statement reference to a heightened burden) warranted a new trial.
- The D.C. Circuit affirmed, holding the factual disputes about primary duties were for the jury and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying a new trial.
Issues
| Issue | Plaintiff's Argument | Defendant's Argument | Held |
|---|---|---|---|
| Whether defendants were entitled to judgment as a matter of law that plaintiffs were exempt from overtime | Radtke and Cunningham primarily performed coding and thus were non-exempt | Appellants argued evidence (resumes, emails, testimony about supervision, training, projects) showed exempt administrative/professional duties so no reasonable jury could find non-exempt | Denied: factual disputes about primary duties made the exemption a mixed question; jury determinations stand; JML inappropriate because evidence was not one-sided |
| Whether plaintiffs fell under the administrative exemption (primary duty, discretion, relation to management/business operations) | Coding is routine, largely governed by manuals; training/physician guidance did not involve matters of significance or comprise the primary duty | Employer contended training, supervision, independent projects (e.g., revamping procedures, creating super bills) showed administrative exemption | Held for plaintiffs: jury could reasonably find coding was the primary duty and that other tasks did not constitute exempt administrative work |
| Whether plaintiffs fell under the professional exemption (jobs require advanced specialized knowledge) | Job did not require the educational prerequisites; individual credentials are not dispositive | Employer pointed to employees’ certifications and experience to show professional exemption | Denied: jury reasonably could find the job’s required qualifications did not meet the professional-exemption standard |
| Whether trial errors required a new trial (stricken testimony, alleged perjury, counsel’s opening remark about clear-and-convincing standard) | N/A (plaintiffs argued evidence was proper) | Defendants claimed (1) stricken testimony about later non-exempt status was prejudicial, (2) Cunningham contradicted prior statements requiring a perjury instruction, (3) opening remark misstated burden (clear-and-convincing) and confused jury | Denied: district court’s curative instructions were adequate; credibility determinations are for the jury (no perjury instruction required); jury instructions and verdict form correctly imposed preponderance standard and jury presumed to follow instructions |
Key Cases Cited
- Robinson-Smith v. GEICO, 590 F.3d 886 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (administrative-exemption legal standard and when exemption is a question of law)
- Icicle Seafoods, Inc. v. Worthington, 475 U.S. 709 (1986) (distinguishing factual time-allocation questions from legal exemption questions)
- Muldrow v. Re-Direct, Inc., 493 F.3d 160 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (standard for overturning a jury verdict via judgment as a matter of law)
- Novak v. Capital Mgmt. & Dev. Corp., 570 F.3d 305 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (de novo review of denial of Rule 50 motion)
- Gay v. Petsock, 917 F.2d 768 (3d Cir. 1990) (directed verdict rarely appropriate for party bearing burden of proof)
- Celis, 608 F.3d 818 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (presumption that juries follow curative instructions)
- Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756 (1987) (high bar for assuming juries cannot ignore inadmissible evidence)
- Kinney v. District of Columbia, 994 F.2d 6 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (employer bears burden to prove exemption)