Rachel v. Troutt, 820 F.3d 390

Background

Plaintiff Archie Rachel, a 71‑year‑old state prisoner with medical conditions, sued prison medical staff and administrators under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging inadequate medical care, exposure while waiting for medication, and an unfair grievance process.
The district court ordered a Martinez report and stayed discovery for screening; defendants later filed a dispositive motion together with the Martinez report, unblocking a limited discovery window.
Rachel had 21 days to request discovery and to respond to the dispositive motion, but defendants had 30 days to answer discovery; Rachel served discovery within six days but had limited prison law library access (a few hours/week).
Rachel timely moved for an extension of time under Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1) to obtain discovery and research the defendants’ motion; the district court did not rule before the response deadline and later denied the extension and granted summary judgment against Rachel.
On appeal the Tenth Circuit held the district court abused its discretion by denying the extension given the procedural posture, Rachel’s limited library access, the fact‑intensive nature of deliberate indifference claims, and the absence of prejudice to defendants; the grant of summary judgment was reversed and remanded.

Issues

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether district court should have granted extension of time to respond to dispositive motion	Rachel: timely moved for extension due to need to obtain discovery after Martinez report and limited law‑library access	Defendants: Martinez report provided the bulk of needed records; no extension needed	Court: Extension should have been granted; denial was abuse of discretion (reverse & remand)
Whether Martinez report deficiencies required court‑ordered supplementation	Rachel: report omitted/misstated material documents; court should have ordered supplementation	Defendants: Martinez report adequate for screening and contained most records	Court: No error now; supplementation unnecessary at this stage; discovery on remand can address omissions
Whether court erred in denying appointment of counsel	Rachel: indigent, aged, handicapped, complex claims warrant counsel	Defendants: district court has discretion and limited resources	Court: No abuse of discretion in denying request; appointment is only a request under §1915(e)(1)
Whether court erred in denying appointment of a Rule 706 medical expert	Rachel: needs expert to rebut defendants’ medical arguments	Defendants: appointment unnecessary and costly; rarely used	Court: No abuse of discretion; claim not so complex to require court‑appointed expert
Whether summary judgment on grievance/due process claim was erroneous	Rachel: state law creates liberty interest; trial should proceed	Defendants: claim presented as state‑law claim; no federal due process claim was pled	Court: Plaintiff did not raise due process claim below; appellate-first assertion too late; summary judgment on that federal theory not considered
Whether emergency injunction and claims against late‑served nurse require reconsideration on remand	Rachel: injunction and nurse claims were mooted by summary judgment	Defendants: relied on summary judgment	Court: On remand district court should revisit injunction and claims against nurse because summary judgment was reversed

Key Cases Cited

Ellis v. Univ. of Kan. Med. Ctr., 163 F.3d 1186 (10th Cir. 1999) (abuse‑of‑discretion standard for denial of extension under Rule 6(b)).
Mata v. Saiz, 427 F.3d 745 (10th Cir. 2005) (elements of deliberate indifference claim: objectively serious medical need and deliberate indifference).
Gee v. Estes, 829 F.2d 1005 (10th Cir. 1987) (purpose of Martinez report to aid screening, not to provide discovery).
Patty Precision v. Brown & Sharpe Mfg. Co., 742 F.2d 1260 (10th Cir. 1984) (reversing summary judgment where court failed to exercise discretion regarding discovery/extension issues).
Ledford v. Sullivan, 105 F.3d 354 (7th Cir. 1997) (denial of court‑appointed medical expert affirmed where claims not sufficiently complex).
Mallard v. U.S. Dist. Court, 490 U.S. 296 (1989) (statutory language permits requesting but not compelling appointment of counsel).