Rachel Stover v. Experian Holdings, Inc., 978 F.3d 1082

In June 2014 Stover purchased Experian Credit Score and assented to 2014 clickwrap terms that required arbitration and contained a change‑of‑terms clause tying assent to subsequent "then current" terms upon website access.
She canceled the subscription in July 2014. She visited Experian’s website in 2018 (the day before filing suit) but did not allege she received notice of the 2018 terms.
The 2018 terms contained a carve‑out excluding certain FCRA‑related claims from arbitration; otherwise disputes remained subject to arbitration.
Stover sued under the FCRA and state unfair competition laws; Experian moved to compel arbitration and the district court granted the motion, applying the 2018 terms and rejecting McGill-based defenses.
The Ninth Circuit held as a matter of first impression that a mere post‑termination website visit without notice does not bind the visitor to changed terms; the 2014 terms govern and Stover’s claims are subject to arbitration. The court also held McGill did not bar arbitration because the 2014 clause did not facially waive public injunctive relief and Stover lacked Article III standing to seek such relief.

Issue	Plaintiff's Argument	Defendant's Argument	Held
Whether a single website visit after termination binds a user to changed terms under a change‑of‑terms clause	Stover: the 2014 change‑of‑terms clause made later posted terms (2018) binding upon visiting the site	Experian: a mere website visit (no notice/opportunity to review) cannot "activate" changed terms	Held: Not bound. Both parties must have notice of changes; mere visit without notice insufficient.
Whether the 2018 FCRA carve‑out applies to Stover’s claims	Stover: district court properly applied 2018 terms so carve‑out could exempt claim from arbitration	Experian: carve‑out irrelevant if 2018 terms not binding; or claims do not fit carve‑out	Held: Court did not reach carve‑out as binding 2018 terms require notice; 2014 terms apply so arbitration governs.
Whether McGill (California rule invalidating waivers of public UCL injunctive relief) makes the arbitration clause unenforceable	Stover: agreement waives public injunctive relief; McGill renders it unenforceable and exempts her from arbitration; alternatively she should be allowed to amend to plead standing	Experian: the arbitration clause preserves judicial public injunctive relief to the extent required by law; McGill does not apply	Held: Arbitration clause not facially unenforceable; Stover lacks Article III standing to seek public injunctive relief as pleaded, so McGill does not defeat arbitration.

Douglas v. United States Dist. Court for the C.D. Cal., 495 F.3d 1062 (9th Cir. 2007) (changed online terms unenforceable without notice)
Nguyen v. Barnes & Noble Inc., 763 F.3d 1171 (9th Cir. 2014) (distinguishes clickwrap and browsewrap and explains notice requirement for browsewrap)
McGill v. Citibank, N.A., 393 P.3d 85 (Cal. 2017) (California rule: contractual waivers of public UCL injunctive relief are invalid)
Blair v. Rent‑A‑Center, Inc., 928 F.3d 819 (9th Cir. 2019) (arbitration clause that waives public injunctive relief can be unenforceable)
Davidson v. Kimberly‑Clark Corp., 889 F.3d 956 (9th Cir. 2018) (Article III standing for public injunctions requires a plausible threat of future harm)
Bushley v. Credit Suisse First Boston, 360 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2004) (standard of review for motions to compel arbitration)
Knutson v. Sirius XM Radio Inc., 771 F.3d 559 (9th Cir. 2014) (scope and validity of arbitration clauses reviewed de novo)